BATTLE FOR PEACE

By the author of the critically acclaimed
Prejudice and Pride

Krishna Kumar

> IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT PREJUDICE TOWARDS PAKISTAN CUTS ACROSS IDEOLOGICAL LINES, AND THE DISCOURSE OF PEACE THAT DIFFERENT POLITICAL FORMATIONS ESPOUSE IS ALSO UNIFORM

Indo-Pak relations are characterized by a maze of feelings, thoughts and suspicions that have been used to justify chronic distrust and war by successive generations on both sides of the border. The author of the critically acclaimed *Prejudice and Pride* explores the foundations of the conflict between India and Pakistan, and examines the prospects of peace in South Asia with a refreshing new perspective. Old platitudes are scrutinized with an uncompromising eye and the complex layers of hostility, prejudice, fear and the reluctance to reconcile are looked at afresh.

Krishna Kumar touches upon a range of contexts, such as the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the role of the media in shaping the path to peace, and the violence in Kashmir. The reader is invited to contemplate important questions: Why was the Father of our nation killed? Why has no textbook of Indian history ever bothered to deal with that question? How do the legacies of Gandhi and Jinnah affect us to this day?

This is an introspective and thought-provoking book from which emerges a persuasive argument for peace, while the rhetoric of a romantic past is rejected. It will doubtless offer new ways of looking at this historic conflict to anyone who seeks a deeper, more constructive understanding of it.

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PENGUIN BOOKS
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Krishna Kumar's critically acclaimed book, *Prejudice and Pride*, was published by Penguin India in 2001. His other works include *Political Agenda of Education*, *Learning from Conflict*, *The Child's Language and the Teacher* and *What Is Worth Teaching*. He has authored several books in Hindi, and also writes for children. A professor of education at the University of Delhi, he is currently the director of the National Council of Education Research and Training (NCERT).

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KRISHNA KUMAR

For Kajal

Introduction

Sameness vs. difference is the familiar axis of Indo-Pak dialogue, or what little there is of it. As Indians, we intuitively choose similarities between the two countries as our ground for seeking peace. This choice looks so obvious to us that we cannot understand how anyone might resent it. We find ample evidence of our claim in language, music, food habits, common reflexes, and so on. In terms of these elements of culture, aren't India and Pakistan extremely similar or close to each other, we ask. We propose this grand finding as the ground to demand peace. The possibility that some Pakistanis might actually feel unhappy with our insistence that similarity is a sound basis for peaceful coexistence sounds bizarre. We end up befriending the selected Pakistanis who agree with the similarity argument. But even these chosen ones feel bewildered and nervous, even suspicious, as the dialogue advances. This discomfort is reminiscent of the pre-1947 days when Indian leaders opposed to Partition were pleading with their pro-Partition counterparts to stop insisting that we were two nations.

Partition took place despite these pleas. Over the long decades since Partition, Pakistan has tried to establish itself

as a modern nation which can claim to be different from India. This effort gained urgency and intensity following the 1971 war when Pakistan lost a major limb of its geographical and cultural body. Young Pakistanis socialized in the late 1970s and afterwards wonder why Indians don't notice their country's desire and efforts to be different from India. The expectation that India should recognize and respect the effort is an aspect of Pakistan's search for a stable and strong national identity. It is also the extension of an old emotional strain which sustains Pakistan's search for modernity. This strain finds its resonance in the larger tension with Western modernity that Islam, as an organized religion, is negotiating. But the Pakistani question addressed to Indians—Why don't you accept us as different and equally worthy of respect?— usually remains unspoken. If it were articulated, the Indian side would ignore it, and the Pakistani who made the mistake of articulating it would feel further embarrassed and angry.

One encounters this imaginary dialogue in different and nuanced forms, depending on the background and class of the participants from the two sides. Punjabis from across the border hug with customary vitality, replacing words with the familiar body language of a common culture, ignoring the implications tightly woven around the hug. Urban middle-class visitors to Pakistan from the Hindi–Urdu heartland wonder how long it would take for the dominant Punjabis to understand the complexity of all that happened in the mid-1940s and since. Working-class Pakistanis give the impression that money and Indian movies matter more than Pakistan, but they do not mean it. Each time I have talked to schoolchildren in Pakistan, I have realized that they are

the true representatives of the future. Their discourse reveals that their nation has come to stay. Difficult though it is, we have to appreciate that Pakistan might have been similar to us once, but it is different from us now.

This book is about the reasons for this position and the challenge it presents to our efforts for peace. Some of my arguments are derived from history, some from the domestic processes active in the two countries. This analysis is expected to help the reader gain peace within as a first step towards peace with a neighbour for whom our feelings range from indifference to disgust. The idea that peace within is necessary for peace outside is not new, but it constitutes an uncharted dimension in the context of Indo-Pak dialogue because neither country has had reasons or occasion to introspect. The fact that Partition occurred on the basis of religion, though its genesis was political, poses a sensitive, spiritual challenge for peace. Religion makes a deep claim on identity, and although Hinduism is not the only defining feature of India's modern identity, it is an important aspect of how we react to the idea and existence of Pakistan. As for Pakistan, its Muslimness needs no explanation, though it is now an established fact that Islam has not proved sufficient as a resource for Pakistan's quest for identity. Given the importance of religion in these somewhat different ways for both countries, it follows that peace may require change in our beliefs and knowledge about the 'other'. Awareness of our own deepest thoughts can give us the flexibility to be Hindus without hating Pakistani Muslims though they live in a country established with so much violence; and a parallel flexibility to be Muslims without hating Hindus though they

have not stopped resenting Pakistan for a variety of reasons. Religion-based layers of identity are harder to negotiate, especially when modern education socializes us into the religion of secularism, which claims deeper roots in reason than any religion can. This is how we turn indifferent towards the need to engage with different religions.

To replace the sameness vs. difference axis, I propose that India and Pakistan should recognize the larger scene of which they are a part. This scene is popularly as well as academically addressed these days under the fuzzy but useful name of 'globalization'. What meaning we attribute to it depends on our particular assumptions regarding economic policies, and changes in technology and culture. This is a vast matter, but it directly affects how any one of us watches and interprets the daily news. Aren't India and Pakistan sailing in the same boat in the context of the pervasive changes taking place in the global economic order, technology and culture? The metaphor can perhaps be updated and given greater meaning if we replace the proverbial boat with an aeroplane, for the world is changing far too rapidly for leisurely contemplation or agreement on how different countries are coping with the speed of change. Even those who perceive speed to be a sign of progress don't quite know how to settle or intervene in fundamental debates arising out of the debris of social theories. It will undoubtedly take the social sciences a long time to analyse the changes that have occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the availability of the Internet for civilian use, to refer to just two signposts of global change. One thing does, however, look somewhat clear, and that is the renewal of colonial-style brazenness in the

mighty and their urge to reorder the world so that colonial hegemonies sustain.

The debate on this process promises to be shrill and long, but it need not prevent us from noticing the thrust of corporate culture and ideology in countries like India and Pakistan. In neither case can we fail to spot the extent to which the role of the state as a custodian of external and internal security has grown at the expense of its role in human welfare. Signs of this change are evident in both India and Pakistan, though the spread of these signs forms a somewhat differential pattern, given the difference in the social, political and economic landscapes. The privatization and commercialization of foundational services like health and education has been advancing on an unprecedented scale in the recent past, hitting the poverty-stricken masses hardest in both countries. Now, in education, this process is about to cover liberal higher education, signalling the entry of global corporate players in the innermost orbit of cultural regeneration. This is the orbit where knowledge is exchanged, enhanced and designed.

In Pakistan, this domain has been in a highly eroded condition since the damaging Zia years. In India, the process of corporatization is intensifying somewhat belatedly and facing some predictable resistance. The larger context is identical for both countries. The determination of global corporate powers, fully entrenched in certain nation states of the wealthier world, to treat knowledge as a commodity forms this larger context. Not that knowledge was not a commodity earlier, but this time we are witnessing the refusal to acknowledge other dimensions to knowledge. To argue that the trend is endemic to capitalism is to miss the specific historical crisis that the

former colonies are facing. Taken in by the selective signs of India's capacity to cope with the crisis, we would also miss the grim and gloomy implications that the reduction of knowledge into being treated exclusively as a commodity has for education and all other awareness-building agencies. Without their survival, growth and reform, peace has little chance to become a social and state priority in South Asia. If India and Pakistan are to respond effectively to the challenges arising from this global and explicitly political calamity, they can only do so together. Weren't they the first among the colonized to gain freedom by intellectual means? The semiology of togetherness at the historical moment of our birth as modern nations represents a great potential for resisting the prospect of South Asia's knowledge and culture being misappropriated. It is no less than a civilizational crisis which has already begun to reduce South Asia—a vaster cultural space, extending beyond the malnourished body of SAARC—into becoming an endemically violent region. The saturation of South Asia with modern, imported arms is fully underway. In the strained condition of our minds, as we watch this and related processes, it is important for us to imagine a future in which both India and Pakistan can coexist with dignity. Peace is always an act of imagination, whereas war is a matter of preparedness. In an unusual Hindi film, *Veer–Zaara*, we come face-to-face with this nature of peace. The film is about a love affair that succeeds, but not before long years of the hero's and also the heroine's youth are wasted in a terrible drama of helplessness framed by the Indo-Pak conflict. The message this film has is unusual, because its story does not talk about reunification; rather, it explores reconciliation in an indeterminate future.

I

Birla House and Rajghat

At the end of our excursion to Birla House, where Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated, one of my students said she wanted to ask a question. We had spent about an hour ambling through the picture gallery. Prior to that, we had meditated for about ten minutes a few metres away from the spot where Gandhi had fallen on 30 January 1948. The spot carries no sign with any historical details. Only the date and Gandhi's last words, 'Hey Ram', are engraved on a small, shiny brown stone pillar. Neither the numbers, nor the letters are well-designed. Indeed, you are struck by the lack of sophistication in the engraver's hand, and if you are visiting the place for the first time, you cannot avoid wondering for a passing moment why a better artist was not chosen to do the job. The pillar stands under a tiny, modest canopy which is probably meant to protect the pillar and the spot from the sun and rain. All around is a reasonable lawn; not lush, as they have in many of the ministerial bungalows in the vicinity in every direction, and not just in the Claridges Hotel next door. Once again, you wonder why the grass is not better maintained. Embedded in what grass

there is, you notice a long series of cement footsteps going all the way from the canopy to the building across the lawn, to the room from which Gandhi emerged in order to walk slowly to the place of his murder.

The cement steps are apparently an attempt to assist the visitor's imagination. What about the crowd waiting to hear Gandhi that evening? Looking at the lawn and the spring flowers, it is difficult to picture the scene in the winter of 1948 in a city exhausted by riots and refugees. The cement steps look firm and shapely as they stand slightly above the malnourished grass. Perhaps they would help schoolchildren who visit this place to work out Gandhi's path from his room to the spot where the pillar and the canopy stand.

My students were all in their early twenties. I had wondered if they thought the cement steps were a little silly. I noticed one of them walking alongside the steps to the room they led to, and looking a little disappointed that the door Gandhi had used was locked. It was open from the other side: the official side. After all, this was a museum, with an official entrance and exit, the usual sullen staff, blissfully unaware of how jarring their behaviour looked in a place as sombre as this. One of them, a tall, manly figure dressed in white khadi, had loudly shouted for a full ten minutes at his juniors. While he was screaming and livid, I had a strong impulse to ask him to consider the impression he was giving to his foreign visitors. A few tourist companies have included Birla House in their daily bus rides. A bus had just arrived when the senior official started shouting. Something stopped me from interrupting him. I suppose it was the thought that truth must prevail. Gandhi had said, reproduced in the

quotation painted on one of the display panels, that he had nothing new to teach, for truth and non-violence were as ancient as the hills. Anger and violence in a museum associated with him were not new to me. Years ago, I had witnessed the slapping of two children inside the picture gallery of Sabarmati Ashram in Ahmedabad. Their crime was that they had slowed down to look at one of the panels while the rest of their classmates had been shooed forward by their resolute teacher.

As there had not been any questions since our entry into Birla House, I was happy to hear that there was one now. I warmly asked what it was, telling the others to be attentive so that we could all discuss it. The student said she wanted to know why Gandhiji was shot. Noticing that I was a little flustered, she added that she knew *who* had killed Gandhiji, but *why* she did not know. The question was highly relevant to our surroundings that moment, but I felt inconsolably frustrated and tired, though it was quite early in the day.

I was aware by now that this was the first time this group, barring one student, had visited this place. Two of them had told me in the picture gallery that they had not even known that such a place existed. The girl who had followed the concrete footsteps wondered aloud why her school had never brought her here. 'They took us to Rajghat, but why not here?' she asked. I replied that this was something worth thinking about. What could I say about why Gandhiji was killed, without showing my surprise that this question was being asked by college graduates about to become teachers. Even this I could not honestly ask, for I knew why they did not know, and why they were not supposed to know. This last bit of knowledge has been the most disappointing of all,

over the decade during which I have been interested in this problem.

I remember my own first visit to Birla House in the early 1980s. It annoyed me in the following years that the place remained so little known; why it was not important enough to be seen by visitors to Delhi, I realized only gradually. There was a meaning in this neglect, and the contest between Rajghat and Birla House hid a deep hole in India's modern mind.

Whereas Birla House was quite unfamiliar and new to my students, Rajghat was just the opposite. They had been taken to Rajghat more than once by their school, and they had read, in newspapers, about the ritual visits that important politicians and foreign dignitaries made to it. In any case, Rajghat was, for many, a part of their daily negotiation with Delhi's urban geography, located as it was on Ring Road—known to painters of road signs as Mahatma Gandhi Road—and, therefore, on a very common bus route. However, my students' unfamiliarity with Birla House could not be attributed to its location alone. To believe that would amount to ignoring a silent agreement that has shaped India's civic life since Gandhi's assassination. The two parties involved in the agreement can be viewed as rival socio-historical configurations vying for cultural hegemony and political control since long before Gandhi's murder. We can conveniently identify the configurations with the help of two well-established ideological labels: pluralistic secularism and religious or cultural nationalism, but the moment we do so, we run into the long and ongoing debate over the meaning of pluralistic secularism. Those who are identified with the latter term have never accepted their ineligibility to be viewed

as representatives of the former term. Over the recent years, the 'cultural nationalists' have been saying that they are the real secularists, and that those who have been calling themselves secular are hypocrites, or 'pseudo-secular'. This shrill debate is so integral an aspect of contemporary political life that I need not dwell on it and, in any case, my real purpose is to discuss the silent agreement that has shaped the relationship between the two camps so far as the public significance of Rajghat, and its absence at Birla House is concerned.

It is not merely young students or children who are *not* taken to see the spot where Gandhi was assassinated. It is also the case that heads of foreign governments are taken to Rajghat, and not Birla House. Nor do India's ruling politicians visit Birla House to pay homage to Gandhi on his birth and death anniversaries, or on Independence Day. This protocol is reserved for Rajghat. Is this a matter of chance or choice?

It can hardly be argued that the place where someone was cremated is given special significance in Hinduism. The opposite is true, except in the case of Maharajas, whose *chattris* can be seen in several north Indian forts. Great yogis and saints do have samadhis, but they are literally *in samadhi*, i.e., they are buried, not cremated there. In Delhi, apart from Rajghat, the spots where Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Sanjay and Rajiv Gandhi, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Charan Singh were cremated have gained a peculiar status. Indeed, the choice of this stretch of Ring Road for nationally significant cremations has posed difficulties arising from competitive politics, and not just the problem of finding space

in the neighbourhood of Gandhi and Nehru along the banks of the Yamuna. Rajghat is, of course, special, and has an ambience of its own. Its simple design, especially its vast openness, captures Gandhi's trusting demeanour a little too explicitly. Any symbolic distance between the man and the monument is further reduced by the handful of trees of varying heights standing in homely isolation and forming no pattern. The surrounding low veranda was perhaps designed to convey Gandhi's preference of a simple lifestyle, and this message too is now somewhat exaggerated by the conspicuous presence, in parts of the veranda, of poles and other material used to erect shamianas when VIPs arrive on important days to publically spin khadi and listen to Gandhi's favourite bhajans. From the road, one approaches the main quadrangle through what looks like a tunnel, but in reality is no more than a longish, upwardly sloped passage leading to the entrance, where one is asked to take off one's shoes and pay a fee in order to ensure their safe return. Barring this, Rajghat charges no fee, but at the main site of Gandhi's cremation a charity box sits next to the shiny, black thick square-shaped stone. This is the heart of Rajghat. One sees visitors standing with folded hands, some kneeling, their children looking on, wondering perhaps if this is a temple. The place does have a religious feel to it, and rightly so, considering that Gandhi was a Mahatma. But then he was a political leader too, and Rajghat is supposed to be a *national* monument, architecturally and environmentally responsible for conveying Gandhi's idea of India, not just his personal spiritual journey.

As you walk back towards the Ring Road and catch a line of the devotional song being played on a cheap cassette

player at the official bookstore, you inevitably catch the impression of poverty and neglect. India is not known for sophistication in the upkeep of historical monuments, and Rajghat is no exception. Nor is it an exception in being a part of the law-and-order state that India continues to be, long after colonial rule. A prominent display board forbids visitors from using the place for activities like eating, playing, spreading garbage, displaying banners or holding meetings. The last item in the long list comprises 'any other undesirable activity'. In this respect too, Rajghat seems designed to isolate the spiritual, saintly Gandhi from his political, historical self, for we all know he was fond of meetings and demonstrations, and had a special fondness for activities that powerful people might consider undesirable.

Rajghat communicates the death of a devout man. His association with history is absent, not just because there is no signboard containing historical dates or other details. History looks irrelevant at Rajghat. Nothing in its assiduously crafted openness reminds us that Gandhi was violently eliminated by a man who had rationalized his intense hatred for him, and who felt that Gandhi was responsible for many unforgivable wrongs, the gravest one being India's partition. Rajghat raises no curiosity or questions in one's mind. All it does is make one aware of a reality larger than life and death. It offers peace of mind because it arouses no disturbing thoughts or questions about the nation to which Gandhi dedicated his life. Rajghat helps us cope with Gandhi's assassination by assigning him martyrdom. When Gandhi is described as a martyr, a battle-like dignity is imparted to his mode of dying. Forget about his non-soldierly style of fighting

for a moment; did he die fighting or was he simply cruelly murdered? The artless peace offered to the visitor at Rajghat has no room for such disturbing queries.

Quite the opposite is true of Birla House. Its graceful, somewhat familiar architecture invites an immediate curiosity about its history. The impression of familiarity has to do with the mixture of styles. My friend and historian, Narayani Gupta, calls it a haveli designed to 'fit in' and to offer a comfortable place to live in post-Lutyen's Delhi. Having compared it to Birla havelis in Rajasthan, I find this an apt description. As one walks through the gates to the lawn at the back where Gandhi fell, the awareness of space and time arrests one's mind. The inset space to your right invokes the memory of a courtyard, but you realize instantly that it is not. The building is just a little too modern to have a courtyard. It is an original structure, designed to cope with a changing material and symbolic reality. Inside, the curved staircase is reminiscent of a haveli, while the lawn at the back could be that of any Lutyen's bungalow. As you appreciate the lawn and the flower-beds around it, the big question— why Gandhi should have met this fate—germinates numerous other curiosities—how could someone hate this old man so intensely; who was the killer; how did he justify himself, and so on. No visitor to Birla House can avoid letting such questions come to mind, and they inevitably force one's attention towards the continued relevance and strange freshness of Gandhi's violent death. This is understandably the biggest difference between Rajghat and Birla House: one seems eternal and, therefore, with no immediate bearing on the passing moment; the other acts as a painful reminder

that modern India is still in the making and has not emerged from the battle in which Gandhi lost his life.

Surprisingly little has been written about Gandhi's murder compared to all that has been written about his life and ideas. There is just not enough research and other writing to help us analyse the drama of his killing. If one sifts through the literature that exists, one gets the distinct impression that the assassination of Gandhi was not an act one could see as a task accomplished once and for all. The trial of Gandhi's principal killer and his colleagues was a tense political event, and a lot of evidence indicates that the killers were not interested in merely making a point. They were aware that they had many sympathizers, and were keen to leave behind a legacy of anxiety about their deed. The statements they made—Nathuram Godse's was particularly elaborate—and all that their lawyers said while trying to defend them carried the marks of a much larger battle of ideas than what the immediate end of an old man's life might encapsulate. Birla House prompts the mind to recall that battle and its current news. It ceases to be a monument then and becomes what it once was: an active field office of Gandhi's. The lawyer Tapan Ghosh was right in concluding his book-length memoir about Gandhi's murder with the feeling that a shadow hangs over Birla House: is it Godse's or is it the spectre of communalism?, Ghosh asks at the end of his book.[1]

Godse's critique of Gandhi was long, and it is not my purpose to summarize it. His biggest charge was that Gandhi was responsible for India's partition. Numerous arguments and a personalized narrativization of events enabled Godse to make this charge. The most important argument was that

Gandhi was pro-Muslim; he took Hindus for granted and ignored their interests. A parallel argument was that Gandhi's non-violence was an eccentricity which proved expensive for the nation. The sweep of Godse's remarks leaves hardly any major national concern untouched. For instance, on the question of India's national language, Godse charges Gandhi with promoting what he calls the 'prostitution of Hindi' by the inclusion of Urdu instead of Sanskrit words. In Godse's perception, Gandhi was the architect of a grand and tragic deception, and his stature allowed him to impose the deception on a suffering, innocent people. Partition is the most hurtful of all the acts Godse attributes to Gandhi's agency. Howsoever great Gandhi was, he says, even he had no right to break up the country. Godse presents his case for murdering Gandhi by saying that he knew that no court would have punished Gandhi for his deeds; therefore someone had to take it upon himself to do it.

What makes Godse's self-confident statement to the court a sad document is the absence of any opening in it for self-doubt, let alone repentance. Indeed, he maintained a high-profile unrepentant attitude all the way to the gallows, and this is what makes Godse an ideological killer. Reading his statement enables us to understand the correct meaning of the word 'ideology'—a system of thought which has no opening for thinking. That Godse was neither crazy nor a fanatic, but an example of what an ideology can do to the mind is a major insight that a visit to the spot where Gandhi fell triggers each time. Birla House reminds us that a man as simple and transparent as Gandhi was killed by intention, and without second thought. The curiosity to know the reason

behind this act pushes the visitor to face familiar questions on Partition and Hindu–Muslim relations. These questions have lingered on, and they regularly resurface when we hear that a riot has been prevented somewhere by timely action on the part of civil authority. How long can we go on like this, one wonders, without any specific picture of a future time when ordinary people will have a steadier life, and a frame of mind capable of resisting the provocation to kill and destroy.

If you are even marginally inclined towards the revivalist line of thought, you are likely to be further encouraged in your thinking by a visit to Birla House. You will come back home ruminating on the compulsions under which India must find its way forward, the price of Partition having been ruthlessly extracted at a crucial point in our national journey. On the other hand, if you are sceptical of revivalist cultural nationalism as an ideology, you are likely to return from Birla House with greater fervour to uphold futuristic modernism, which suggests that history helps when it is left behind. Birla House makes one suspicious that we have a major problem in that there is still—more than half a century after Independence—no consensus in India about its basis. That Godse's idea of India was quite different from Gandhi's—so different that Godse could not tolerate the possibility of Gandhi living any further than he did—is a fact, but Birla House makes it come alive as a living, continuing threat. That is why, one might guess, it has been deemed safer to take foreign dignitaries and schoolchildren to Rajghat instead of Birla House. The implication of this guess or feeling is no less pervasive. If India is to overcome

the shock of Partition, to perceive it as history—tragic, but history all the same, which *can* be understood and lived with—then more people must visit Birla House. They must go there to learn, as directly as one can imagine learning, why Gandhi's life ended with a pistol. By visiting Rajghat one merely renews one's urge to avoid an engagement with history. This is a far more common stance than one might like to imagine, and its popularity owes in no small measure to a flawed and callous system of education.

The poor state of education is nowhere more manifest than in the teaching of history, especially in the textbooks written for schoolchildren. They are, with rare exceptions, written as compendiums of facts: dates, names and sketchy narratives of events. A great deal of public controversy is routinely raised on what is included or dropped, and on the relative authenticity of the facts included, but few people seem to bother about the absence of basic pedagogic awareness and the lack of imagination characteristic of our textbooks. Most of them convey the feeling that their writers do not understand children, and do not consider it relevant to arouse and develop children's curiosities about the past. All they do is tell what happened, and even this bit of duty the writers of textbooks perform without the ingenuity to draw the larger picture with small details that might enable children to absorb the significance of an event. Every event gets the same brief treatment, Gandhi's assassination being no exception. No Indian textbook tries to explain why Gandhi was killed. No textbook writer asks children to find out or guess what might have impelled the assassin. Even the rudimentary pedagogic step of providing a map of Birla House

with a photograph to whet the imagination, so that children might visualize the evening when Gandhi was killed, is not taken. In fact, some writers simply omit Gandhi's assassination as a topic; others have the courtesy to make a mention of it in the cursory, routine manner in which they mention everything else. No one has the temerity to prioritize it as an event deserving special treatment, for after all it involves the physical elimination of the Father of the Nation.

This common state of textbooks is matched by the general character of teacher training. The recent onslaught of commercial single-mindedness has merely added a layer to the pile of reasons which impel one to feel somewhat cynical. The training of teachers, unreformed as it is, makes remarkably little effort to encourage reflection. Visits to monuments do figure in training manuals, but what precisely might be done to distinguish such a visit from a picnic is ignored. Rajghat is a favourite 'history' picnic spot; Birla House is not. No wonder most children have an unpleasant memory of their history classes at school. It is also not surprising that when these children become adults they remain vulnerable to the power of propaganda on matters as crucial for peace and survival as the nature of India's society, and its relations with its next-door neighbour.

Even if I had wanted to, I did not know where to begin answering the question my student had asked. I wanted her to appreciate that there was no simple answer to the question of why Gandhi was assassinated. I wanted her to hold the question in her mind. As we walked through the bookstore at the entrance of Birla House, where a biography of V.D. Savarkar happened to be prominently displayed that

day, I wondered if I could recommend her a book to pursue her curiosity. I looked at the titles peeping through the glass cases and was reminded that little scholarly work existed on Gandhi's assassination. Could I ask her to read Gandhi's life story and other books about his work and philosophy? Perhaps I could, but I knew that reading about Gandhi's life and philosophy would not satisfactorily explain why he was killed by an unimpressed Hindu. The question of why Gandhi incurred so much active anger will remain, for the anger has not died out. The belief continues that Gandhi could have prevented Partition. Selective information about the history of the 1940s, combined with the stereotype of Gandhi as a political magician, has convinced successive generations that he allowed Partition to take place. His use of religious symbols to mobilize the masses is seen as a major initial mistake, later compounded by strategic moves which let the Muslim League gain a tactical advantage. The tendency to attribute to Gandhi an agency of historic proportions has exacerbated the hesitation to ask why the emotional distance between Hindus and Muslims widened since the 1930s in northern India. When it comes to Partition, even those who emphasize social origins of political outcomes deny agency to public perceptions and interests. Official Indian history, in any case, does not permit Partition to be portrayed as a necessity of its time; the only acceptable line is that it violated the civilizational character of India, which is enshrined in independent India's political character. The anger over Partition is, thus, maintained.

So long as we are angry about Partition, Gandhi must take a large amount of blame for it in the secret corners of our mind. We have two options: either we must stop being upset about Partition or stop treating Gandhi as a political magician. In her book *Independence and Partition*, Sucheta Mahajan takes the second option and demonstrates why this is valid.[2] She offers sufficient evidence to prove that large sections of the people desired Partition, and Gandhi was actually aware of this widespread desire. His knowledge of the public mind was as sharp as ever, and this is why he saw no hope of Partition being averted. This perspective is very different from the one cultivated over decades by educational means, with plentiful support from cinema. If the perspective we gain from Mahajan's work gathers energy and popularity, we may one day see Rajghat for what it is—a place to hide from history, an architectural trivia to distract ourselves from the taxing homework we must do to build the foundations of peace in South Asia. The favour shown to Rajghat over Birla House might then look like an unnecessary political and diplomatic affliction. The symbolic distance between the two monuments is a marker of India's continued ambivalence about what it should do with Gandhi. We cherish having him as a symbol of dedication to the nation, but we hardly own him as a symbol which reminds us of a domestic struggle. His disciple and pedagogue, the late Marjorie Sykes, celebrated his 'gift of the fight', but few people today recall or appreciate that Gandhi's fight was hardly confined to the aim of freedom from colonial rule.[3] That his fight was also for social peace poses a difficult challenge today, when we remember that India and Pakistan both possess nuclear bombs and are developing the means of delivering them to their desired destinations.

Places have the power to settle the mind and turn it

towards untried angles of light. When German children visit the Holocaust Museum in Berlin, or when Japanese children visit the Museum of Peace in Hiroshima, they absorb something inconvenient and new about their national identity, something vital for its sustenance and growth. Birla House has the same potential—to make young Indians more aware of the emotional challenge they have inherited from Gandhi; to cherish one's own identity without deriding the other. Identity gives us an energy we can use either to sharpen our edges or, alternatively, to realize our goals in the recognition of the other, as Tagore put it in *The Religion of Man*. When Gandhi died facing a fellow believer in Hinduism who shot at him, he symbolized the folly of distinguishing those who are similar to us from those who are different. In the moment of his violent death, Gandhi overcame the bonds of familiarity as the principle of relatedness. When we visit Birla House, we enjoy a chance to learn that who we think we are has hardly any importance in determining what will happen to us.[4]

II

Litter in Lahore

As adults we hesitate to discuss conflict with children because we feel it is not a suitable topic for them. Our urge to protect and preserve their innocence for as long as possible restrains us from mentioning anything to do with conflict when we are in the company of children. This is true not only of parents, but also of teachers, though they are trained to work with children and should know how to broach any topic, howsoever unpleasant, with them. As professionally trained adults, teachers should also know that conflict is hardly an alien subject for children; that, on the contrary, children have a natural urge to understand conflict and to seek or, at least, imagine a resolution. The desire to live in an orderly world, and to restore order if it has been disrupted, is fundamental to childhood. And the desire is understandably strong when children are surrounded by conflict. No child in any part of the world is protected from the news of conflict thanks to television; but millions of children also directly witness conflict and participate in it. They see violent riots erupting in the streets where they live. In societies facing chronic wars between ethnic groups or

tribes, children are recruited and trained to fight side by side with adults. And we can hardly estimate the number of children who watch conflict between their parents and, at times, become victims of the violence that usually targets the mother. Whatever the mode of their exposure to conflict, children are always interested and forthcoming when an adult wants to discuss with them a subject involving conflict.

There is a difference between dealing with such a subject in the company of children as opposed to adults. Conflict and peace can prove quite tiring as topics for discussion with adults. They take positions as soon as the discussion starts, and then the best part of their energies go into defending their respective positions. The discourse repetitiously veers between the exclamation of sentiments for peace with frequent references to the past on one hand, and the jungle of details which justify war on the other. When children discuss peace and war they stay playful and earthy, willing to take and switch sides according to the strength of an argument. In the course of one evening, I have seen fifteen-year-olds changing their stand half-a-dozen times. As adults we tend to regard this as a sign of immaturity, but we might also see it as a sign of flexibility in the face of persuasive logic. It is pointless to remind a child what he or she had said fifteen minutes ago. Children readily allow an argument to evolve till it gathers a lobby; and they don't mind if the lobby falls apart half-an-hour later. As an outsider to their world, the adult who is moderating the discussion might think they are behaving like pieces of glass bangles placed in a kaleidoscope. But if we see this behaviour from the children's perspective, it is like catching a view of the surroundings of

an old monument from its numerous windows, one by one, and noticing, without feeling self-conscious, how different the scene looks each time.

As an adult, you feel lost and at times confused about the direction of the debate. If your purpose was to orient the audience towards conflict-resolution or peace, you rightly wonder if you have achieved anything as you witness the shaky movement of the discussion, its wide sweep, and its unpredictability. However, if you let it go on long enough, the wealth of ideas and insights generated, and the metaphors used to size up the topic impress and reassure you.

To a great extent, the same applies to children's writing on conflict. When I was working on my first book, *Prejudice and Pride*, I had obtained a bunch of short essays written by class IX children in Lahore on the topic of the division of India and Pakistan.[1] I acquired a larger bunch from children studying in the same class in schools in Delhi. I wanted to think comparatively about the ways in which present day youngsters of the two countries reconstructed the past. I was especially keen to see how they negotiated the time–distance since 1947, and I was impressed by the wide-ranging positions they took on how the implications of Partition have unfolded for Indo-Pak relations. I devoted a full chapter in my book to reporting the details of my analysis, but an essay written by a girl from Lahore remained fresh in my mind, leaving me unsatisfied with my analysis. Her essay included an introspective question which had several layers of resonance. I decided to unravel some of these layers by examining Pakistan's history as a teenager in Lahore might perceive it. To say that this attempt would enable the reader to

understand a young Pakistani's mind is no exaggeration, but to claim that this exercise might also throw some light on the *national* mind that education helps to shape, in collaboration with other agencies of socialization, may well look like an oversimplification. The inadequacy of data— just one child's writing—may be rightly cited to justify this criticism. Also, the idea of a 'national' mind is now out of fashion, if not discredited, as a remnant of Hegel's theory that each nation has its own special spirit. Whether Hegel was right or wrong can be debated, but if one looks at modern systems of education—and they are all national systems— one notices that they use knowledge and pedagogic methods to construct a national mind.

We like to believe that national identities are a weak or declining force in today's globalizing world. Advancements in the technology of communication, especially the availability of the Internet for the general public since the mid-1990s (the US military has been using it for a lot longer), have reinforced the impression that national borders are no longer hard or relevant. The size of diaspora from several Third World societies is another source of this perception. Its error can be judged by realizing the aggressive form nationalism has taken in the case of the world's lone superpower and the biggest ex-colonizer, the US and UK respectively. Arguably, both have a large dissenting public, but the perception that their countries are at war in Iraq for a legitimate reason has gained acceptance in a large proportion of the population in both these nations.

If as an ideology, nationalism seemed to be on the decline in the so-called developed world in the aftermath of the Soviet

break-up in the 1990s, we can hardly miss its assertive resurgence in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Nationalism can hardly be declared to have become an obsolete historical force when the world's most powerful country is repeatedly reminding its own citizens (and others) that it invaded a country geographically far away from it in order to disseminate some of its own key national values, such as freedom and democracy. These values are projected as 'global' or 'universal' values in order to cover the national interests to be served by the invasion of Iraq. Seen this way, globalization looks like a smokescreen for pursuing familiar, narrow national interests. As Indians, we find globalization a tantalizing yet paradoxical proposition. It promises economic opportunities, and the eventual acceptance of our status as a global power. At the same time, we feel at times threatened by the cultural face of globalization. Many argue that behind the homogenizing force of globalization stands the hegemonic agenda of the US. Such a thought invokes cultural nationalism—of the same kind that the demand for Pakistan was based on.

It is a widely held view that Pakistan's self-identity is weakly formed, that Pakistan's viability as an independent nation state stands in constant danger because of its poorly formed national identity. It is true that its national identity has been a matter of anxiety, for its own people and for others too; and for precisely that reason, educational policy in Pakistan has focussed so consistently on socializing the young into a strong belief in Pakistan's nationhood. The idea of a 'national mind' offers us an attractive criterion to judge the outcome of Pakistan's educational and cultural policies.

The question is how to examine Pakistan's national mind. Studying the intriguing resonance of a teenager's remark presents one way, inadequate though it obviously is. The statement in the girl's essay that woke me up was that when she saw litter on the streets of Lahore she wondered if *this* was what the Quaid-e-Azam had created Pakistan for. It is a dramatic point, to say the least, as it looks with anger and also with the confidence to wonder and question. I was quite prepared for the anger, aware as I am that the state of affairs, both political and economic, keeps a large number of Pakistan's citizens chronically upset. It's a rare issue of the three Pakistani magazines I have kept up with over the last five years—The *Friday Times,* The *Herald* and *Newsline*—in which the majority of letters sent to the editor are not brimming with anger over one thing or another. The same is true of the articles, but the teenage girl's remark had availed an unusual context to express anger. The idea of using civic sanitation as a basis for judging Jinnah's achievement struck me as something entirely unexpected.

Jinnah undoubtedly had a vision of what he wanted when he proposed and popularized the idea of a separate state for Muslims. During the final phase of the independence struggle, Jinnah's vision moved towards becoming a strategy for political negotiation, but clarity eluded it all the way to the end, even in a geographical sense. His Independence Day speech suggests that he had envisioned the new nation carved out of India as a secular country. In retrospect, the speech comes across as a statement of confusion—even delusion— but at the time it was given it must have sounded just as uplifting and sublime to Jinnah's followers as Nehru's

midnight speech had sounded to his listeners in India and elsewhere.

Jinnah's idea of Pakistan evolved after his return from Britain in 1934. In this final phase of his political career, Jinnah's perceptions and strategies were, to a considerable extent, shaped by the poet Mohammed Iqbal, though the latter died in 1938. Both men had developed serious doubts about the future of Muslims in independent India. Their personalities and strengths differed, but Iqbal made more than a motivating impact on Jinnah during the mid-1930s. Having offered the vision of a geographically bounded state where Islamic polity would be free to evolve, Iqbal persisted in reshaping Jinnah's political inclination and ultimately succeeded. Iqbal's doubts about the sustainability of an integral Indian nation had philosophical as well as political origins, but Jinnah's doubts were also grounded in his personal political experience. He lived and struggled, it seems, out of personal anger, and succeeded in taking full advantage of the prevailing circumstances in turning his anger into a national dream. Did that dream include sanitation? Maybe, but the question would distract anyone into thinking of the other visionary of the independence struggle: Gandhi. About him one knows for sure that he perceived public sanitation as a goal and a reliable sign of India's propulsion into *swaraj,* while freedom from colonial rule was only a step forward.

In Gandhi's life story, whether written by him or others, one comes across sanitary and hygiene-related themes more than in any other life story one can locate in the market of modern books written over a century, perhaps ever written. One can correctly say, though to say this could be mistaken

for a sign of disrespect, that Gandhi was obsessed with cleanliness. And we know why. In his earlier life, hygiene and sanitation were matters of personal effort, but his later obsession with public hygiene was surely related to his moral rejection of the caste system. Sanitation figures as high on the priority list of Gandhi's utopia as justice and equality, because he perceived untouchability and scavenging as the ultimate injustice. And this linkage was something Gandhi discovered quite gradually, for it does not figure even peripherally in his book *Hind Swaraj*, which was written in 1909.[2] Gandhi's concern for cleanliness and hygiene was part of his commitment to self-reliance and community living, as we can gather from the accounts of the Phoenix and Tolstoy farms he set up in South Africa. However, public hygiene became a political programme for him in the 1930s, after he had pressurized Ambedkar to withdraw his demand for a separate electorate for the 'untouchable' castes, and to settle for a reserved quota in the general category. Constructive work and reform in the Hindu social order were high on Gandhi's priority list, but the Poona Pact of 1932 between him and Ambedkar appears to have made a decisive impact on his view that public sanitation held the key to weakening caste oppression, and social transformation.

Can we think of an Indian teenager who might remark when she sees litter on a street: 'Did Gandhiji make India free for this?' Several reasons come to mind to explain what makes it highly unlikely that an Indian youngster would make such a remark. For one thing, though Gandhi is regarded, idolized, and frequently cited as the Father of the Nation, far less is done during the school years in India to familiarize

children with Gandhi's life and vision than is done for Jinnah in Pakistan. Indeed, Gandhi's status as the Father of the Nation has remained largely metaphorical—a matter of saying only—in the absence of any assiduous public educational effort to establish discontinuity between the independent India fathered by Gandhi and its older historical versions. On the contrary, public education has remained committed to a belief in the continuity of India since ancient times. Gandhi's fatherhood of the nation has its substantial justification in the idea of freedom, but even in this limited context there are competing thoughts. India's right to freedom had had the status of a natural right, articulated first by Tilak, long before Independence. Leaders of the national movement did outline the ideals that India would pursue after it became free, but there was no consensus about these ideals. For some leaders, freedom promised to furnish an opportunity to recover the ideals which, according to them, India had attained in ancient times and later frittered away. Others thought that freedom would enable India to absorb the ideals of modernity associated with the European Renaissance. A third line presented Independence as a condition necessary to pursue a new set of goals, different from India's own traditional ideals, but also different from the ideals associated with the West's progress. This third perspective is best represented by Gandhi, whose ideals evoked a mixed response and continue to look somewhat arcane, though his stature as the leader of India's freedom movement remained undisputed after Independence. Indeed, if one tries to assess India's progress on the basis of Gandhi's ideals, the attempt soon begins to look unfair, to Gandhi as well as to

the India he did not live to see coming into its own in a rapidly changing world. The state of free India evolved its goals through a prolonged and complex process of deliberation in which some of Gandhi's ideals got accommodated, while others got compromised or left out. Public sanitation emerged neither as a political priority, nor as a cultural, educational concern.

In the case of Pakistan, the ideals it stood for did not need to be invented and articulated. The basis on which Pakistan was demanded was the fear that the ideals of Islam might not be safe under Hindu dominance. Thus, Islam became the symbolic resource for Pakistan to draw on in its struggle to live as an independent nation. It was a matter of some circumstantial irony that the man who symbolized Pakistan and made its creation inevitable represented a European outlook on what freedom and progress might constitute for Pakistan. However, Pakistan's real options—whether it would aspire to become like a European country, a pale copy of Britain, to begin with, or would it carve out a new model of modernity from within the Islamic tradition—failed to crystallize through sustained public debate. The period of official leadership Jinnah's life permitted him was too brief to serve as a time for debate. The apparent contradiction between the secular approach to nationalism that he had preferred and articulated in his Independence Day speech, and the conservative approach espoused by the clergy, proved too wide to be bridged. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, this contradiction widened and made nation-building increasingly difficult.

Within a decade, the limited social space for democratic

deliberation started to shrink quite rapidly, and the armed forces took over. This was hardly an unexpected misfortune, given the disproportionate share of the military component that the British imperial state had drawn from the areas falling under West Pakistan after Independence. The ideals Jinnah would have preferred Pakistan to follow were much too nuanced to be sustained in a nation under its army's control. On the contrary, the symbolic value of Islam as a structure of ideals and values was familiar to all social strata and regions. An inarticulate or tacit acceptance of religiously guided, reluctant modernity became the operative policy of the state. In its functioning, the state became increasingly less transparent and accountable even as the judiciary, universities and the press weakened due to stress. This, however, did not affect the symbolic value of Pakistan's birth. Rather, the more opaque and corrupt and wanton the state became, the greater and more inspiring looked the idea of Pakistan. As civic institutions caved in and everyday anxieties mounted, the original idea of Pakistan gained in symbolic value. The man who had seen the vision of Pakistan and had turned it into reality became an icon whose own ideas and beliefs became a matter of mere detail. In aspects where he lacked as the architect of a religious state, another icon—Allama Iqbal—provided compensation.

It is not easy for Indians to associate Pakistan with any kind of idealism. To quite a few of us, the idea looks funny, if not outrightly wrong. Nor does our acculturation permit us to perceive Jinnah as a visionary. Our normal perception compels us to view Pakistan as a pathology, a country born out of reasons we regard as anything but rational and good,

and one where democracy has failed to prosper. We have inherited a negative mindset towards Pakistan from the history we came to know in our young days and we see no reason to correct this mindset. On the contrary, we nurture it by teaching the young a history of modern India which does not accommodate and rationally account for the history of Pakistan. Moreover, we do little to familiarize ourselves or our children with Pakistan's history since Independence and its current affairs. We thus maintain a memory of trauma and violence as the last record of that country in our mind. This negative memory has been reinforced by the wars which erupted in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. As happens to any country which goes through repeated wars with the same enemy, India has formed, in what we may rightly call its national mind, a frozen image of Pakistan as an aggressive, untrustworthy neighbour. The mass media, particularly cinema and television, have dispersed this image across the length and breadth of India, making it an integral part of the nation's ethos. Even though school education does not actively promote this image—unlike schools in Pakistan which do disseminate precisely such an image of India—nevertheless, schools and colleges do little to engage with it in the interest of peace building. Moreover, this image of Pakistan has served as a ready-to-cash blank cheque for politicians of all hues. For these reasons, it is not possible for us to appreciate the idealism implicit in the essay written by the girl in Lahore.

What about her anger, though? Are we in any better position to appreciate her anger over the sight of litter, than we are for appreciating her idealism? Her exasperation is apparently directed at the state of civic life in Pakistan.

Roadside garbage is only a visible symbol of the state's failure to live up to Jinnah's dream of a prosperous, efficient Pakistan. For an unprejudiced Indian, this kind of anger in a Pakistani teenager's heart ought to echo the anger often felt, but not always articulated, at India's own street affairs. In the Pakistani youngster's case, the indignation has found the tallest icon of idealism available in the national pantheon to pass judgement on the state, civic authorities being its everyday face. The girl is articulating her disappointment with those who have the power to run Pakistan. Disappointment serves as a vehicle for anger when disapproval is profound. It is a positive expression, verging on rejection and showing an urge to avoid cynicism. So long as a high standard is considered worthy of use for judging, one stays protected from cynicism. As Indians, we may not be able to appreciate the youngster's anger precisely because it is not a sign of cynicism, and because it has an element of the hope that civic authorities who permit garbage to gather in the streets of Lahore can be shamed by being reminded of the struggle Jinnah undertook in order to create Pakistan. Our education, acculturation, and experience impel us to take a cynical view of Pakistan. We do believe that Pakistan is not a project worthy of success. Hasn't it already proved its unsustainability by getting disintegrated in 1971, and by continued failure to nurture democracy, not to speak of its economic stagnation and indebtedness?, we tend to ask. Our negative image, as well as any reasonable analysis of the limited view of Pakistan we entertain, persuade us to hope that Pakistan will one day cease to exist. This is, of course, a common fantasy of all enemies, except that it would make no sense for Pakistan to entertain such a fantasy

in the context of India. Pakistan's fantasy as an enemy of India can at best visualize a future in which India might disintegrate, whereas India's fantasy can truly picture a world map *without* Pakistan because, if Pakistan disintegrates, whatever is left will not likely be called Pakistan.

I have met very few Indians who have spared a few moments to think about, and I have not come across any written account of, the scenario which might unfold when the fantasy of Pakistan's dissolution becomes a reality. Beyond the general feeling that such a thing will prove India's point, we do not know how, precisely, we will be affected if Pakistan really breaks up. 'Will it do any good to India?' is a similar question. Even in serious seminars, and not just drawing room gatherings, the fantasy of Pakistan's eventual break-up and end as a nation arouse the kind of glee that adults associate with children, though real children are quite alien to such fantasy-induced glee about a change in reality. In adults, the pleasure derived from this kind of imagined solution indicates how intensely they hate the problem. Pakistan, as India's problem, evokes other responses too, and these have been brilliantly classified by Mani Shankar Aiyar in his *Pakistan Papers*.[3] The ultimate solution which might come from within Pakistan enjoys greater and cheaper popularity than the solution we might impose. The other responses to the Pakistan problem are quite well known. One is the desire to ignore it and carry on with our own pursuits; another is to actively set Pakistan right, by military means if necessary. Yet another one is to encircle it diplomatically, so that as many countries as possible start disliking it. All of these responses fulfil the same psychological need in some measure that the fantasy of

the end of Pakistan fulfils completely. An autorickshaw driver expressed this need quite unforgettably to me when, at the height of the Kargil war, he asked, 'Why don't we finish Pakistan once and for all?' I noticed he was looking aggressively at a small neighbourhood park. The way politicians talk about war with Pakistan is not radically different.

Whenever I have tried to discuss the topic of hatred towards Pakistan with students, the expected counter-question has seldom failed to surface within a few minutes: 'Don't Pakistanis hate India?' In my course on peace education, we decided to pursue this subject more deeply than is possible in normal conversation. We analysed the nature of hatred as a feeling, and identified some of its common characteristics. One was that, like love, it is reciprocal. A second feature we discussed was that hatred has great motivating energy. It inspires the hater to assemble the conditions necessary to sustain hatred. One such condition is indifference to the other's lot. More active forms of this condition are the urge to hear bad news about the other, the urge to find an opportunity to engage with the other violently, and with the intention to damage or destroy. None of my students were in any doubt that these urges are common in Pakistan, but they were somewhat surprised by the thought that they may be common in India too. From this perspective, it is just as well that Pakistan generates so much bad news. The domestic shift to medievalism that took place under General Zia in policies pertaining to women, culture and education, the sectarian strife which has grown increasingly violent since the late 1980s, the loss of face suffered over

Kargil and Afghanistan, and the opprobrium Pakistan has invited by harbouring terrorist organizations do bring comfort and satisfaction to a lot of Indians. In the absence of a consistent expression of the desire to be friendly—notwithstanding one-day cricket and musical nights—the satisfaction derived from negative news nourishes the seeds of hatred. These seeds are also, in any case, watered rather copiously by the politics of emotions, directed against Muslims and Islam, which have gathered global momentum since the 11 September attacks in the US. Those who do not like Muslims for one reason or another, or without reason, and find nothing good in Islam, see in the news of every sectarian killing in Pakistan a ray of hope. This kind of hope qualifies them to dismiss the Lahore girl's anger over Pakistan's failure to keep its streets clean as a sign of her indoctrination.

There is a benign Indian fantasy too, but the vision of change in Indo-Pak relations it offers is not substantially different. In friendlier moments, during patches of relative peace in Kashmir, many of us wonder why India and Pakistan cannot reunite. In this version of an imaginary solution, Partition becomes a bad memory. The feeling that peace with Pakistan would make its separate existence unnecessary has so much strength and intrinsic logic that it does not let us notice its premise. It is neither the desire to reconcile nor the anxiety about war, for both these urges depend on keeping the 'other' alive. If the other's entity becomes a part of the self in a moment of imagined peace, it is hardly a case of acceptance and readiness to 'forgive' the other for separating in the ever-present past. In the heart of the tangle is our

continued though deeply buried anger over Partition, and our inability to see adequate justification in it. In this posture of imagination, we are still saying to the Muslims who preferred and succeeded in getting a separate country: 'How could you go that far?' The subtext of that question is: 'Don't you see what you did was absurd? Haven't you realized that it was a mistake? Don't you want to undo it?' There are occasions when this subtext rises to the surface. When a visitor from Pakistan makes a public speech, the discussion following it often gets stuck on questions, such as: 'Don't you think a lot of Pakistanis regret Partition?', or 'Won't it be better for India and Pakistan to learn from East and West Germany?' The embarrassed visitor does not know how rude he can afford to get in order to dismiss the question. The questioner, on the other hand, does not know that he has embarrassed the visitor. 'Don't you think Partition was a mistake?'

As Indians, we do find it difficult to believe that most Pakistanis continue to rejoice in Partition, and others at least see some justification in it. They are under despotic military rule, so they cannot express their true feelings, we think in the course of our benign fantasy. Or perhaps they have been brainwashed. Such assumptions help us to regard the Indian project of pluralist democracy as being intrinsically superior to the Pakistani project of building an Islamic nation. In this moment of benign fantasy, the idea of Pakistan looks either a mistake or a conspiracy; but when the two possibilities become equally viable alternatives, the distinction between pluralist secularism and Hindu nationalism loses its relevance. To the secular pluralist, the creation and continued existence of Pakistan under military rule looks like a tragedy. So it

does to the Hindu nationalist as well, but it has an added poignancy in acting as a reminder of Hindu vulnerability. For the Hindu nationalist mind, Pakistan serves both as an object of hatred and also as a source of inspiration for Hindu resurgence which might, one day, make India a kind of 'Hindu Pakistan', as Jawaharlal Nehru once put it. It is a paradoxical role, for it requires the continuation of Pakistan as a distinct entity while it recommends the end of Pakistan as the only possible solution to the threat it poses to India's integrity. A hostile Pakistan serves as the latest evidence and reminder— in a series that goes back in Hindu revivalist thought to medieval times—of the extent to which Hindus can justifiably allow evil to be wrought on them. Yet, the only solution that qualifies for peace in this approach is for Pakistan to give up its project, either voluntarily, out of the self-awareness gained from experience, or under force, and to reunite with India.

At the levels of belief and behaviour, one can identify several shades in Hindu revivalism. They do inhabit a broad ideological orbit, but they represent different points on a continuum, from moderate to extreme forms. The extreme forms demand a hard view of Pakistan, of how it came into being, what it stands for, and what it is capable of doing to India. There appears no room for reconciliation in this view, for a decisive war seems inevitable. The moderate view, on the other hand, comprises the will to patch up with what is essentially a creation of historical errors, as a cautious but necessary step towards annulling Partition. The attainment of this goal is seen as a condition for India to fulfil its destiny. A divided India cannot perform its destined role on the global

stage, according to this view. It is interesting to note that belief in destiny was a major factor in the formation of Pakistan; according to official national memory, Pakistan's destiny to become a nation was first sensed by Syed Ahmad Khan more than a hundred years ago. That India too has a destiny, which requires Pakistan to reunite with India, thus makes even the moderate version of Hindu revivalism clash with the ideology of Pakistan, and renders any moves towards peace a mere strategy. Not surprisingly, however, the Pakistani state feels quite comfortable negotiating for peace with Hindu revivalist leaders, as was evident from the progress made towards peace talks under the government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party. It is with the secular parties in India that the Pakistani state feels puzzled, because they do not resonate Pakistan's official conception of India.

The benign version of Pakistan's fantasy can be seen in moments of self-doubt, especially among the young, who feel unnecessarily encumbered by the legacy of a past they don't fully understand. Their socialization into Pakistani citizenhood proves inadequate on two counts. In the first instance, they feel unsure about Pakistan's nation-building project, and secondly, some of them find themselves insufficiently different from their Indian counterparts. Opportunities to visit other countries, including India, trigger such uncertainties. They imagine, and often find evidence to say, that youngsters in India too have doubts about the official Indian view of Pakistan. They feel that India too will gradually change its view of Pakistan and appreciate its position on Kashmir. On Kashmir, even the inadequately acculturated Pakistani youngsters feel that their country was

deceived. The Kashmir issue has a deeper anchoring in the Pakistani mind than we normally appreciate. The fact that it has a Muslim majority population contributes to the sense of identification that even the liberal or pacifist Pakistanis feel with the official position on Kashmir. They do not appreciate the Indian view that the violence in Kashmir is backed by the Pakistan state. They subscribe to the official line that Pakistan is merely supporting a struggle that the Muslims of Kashmir have waged against India.

They apparently don't know, nor have the occasion to contemplate how sore feelings in India are about militancy in Kashmir as a proof of Pakistan's diabolical desire to snatch that state away from India's hands and to create pervasive civil strife in India. Indeed, Pakistanis do not know how little Indians know about Pakistan, but it is also true that Pakistanis, especially the young, know little about the growth of militancy in Kashmir as an outcome of the policies pursued under Zia-ul-Haq's rule. All that happened in Pakistan under Zia's eleven year regime remains irrelevant to the Indian perception of Pakistan and to present-day Pakistan's perception of its own state. That the regime actively induced young, able-bodied men into becoming jehadi fighters and trained them for the anti-Soviet, US-backed civil war in Afghanistan, in order to sustain itself with legitimacy is known to experts but is rarely discussed as a factor explaining the decline of Pakistan into a manipulated polity. Nor is this awareness used to explain the post-Soviet growth of militancy in Kashmir. The financial and political advantages accruing to the civil–military establishment under Zia from the US backing of the mujahideen in Afghanistan are regarded as

Pakistan's domestic facts. Devoid of such facts because they are domestic, the discourse of Indo-Pak conflict in India imparts to Pakistan a monolithic national will for its demonic actions in Kashmir since the late 1980s. Given the general ignorance in India about Pakistani society, especially its ethnic diversity and the range of opinions prevailing in it, the attribution of a unified national will to Pakistan-backed terrorism in Kashmir succeeds in making every Pakistani a mischief-maker in Indian eyes. This perceptual shaping is appreciably heightened by the continuing stereotype of Muslims as traitors who have divided India once and can do so again. The parallel stereotype of Hindus as a wily and wicked people, which has been actively nurtured through education in Pakistan, makes it difficult for people there to wonder why India is so bitter about the role Pakistan has played in Kashmir. The lack of popular awareness about the policies followed under Zia's regime make the Indian perception even more inscrutable. True, the intellectual elite have now started hating Zia, conveniently forgetting that he did not act alone. His *mazar* in Islamabad continues to draw a daily crowd of masses.

It is not impossible to imagine that the knowledge of what Pakistan has gone through as a society under successive military regimes can create a somewhat better situation for peaceful understanding in India. On the Pakistani side too, awareness of the extensive damage done to domestic order and external relations during the 1980s is confined to a section of the elite. The Islamization policy followed by the Zia regime in matters pertaining to culture and education implied a significant shrinkage of civic space. That space was limited

to begin with, given the extremely slow and inefficient spread of education and the difficulties of weaving a culturally diverse society into a homogeneous fabric. Education was expectedly perceived as a key instrument of achieving homogeneity by disseminating the ideology of Pakistan as an Islamic nation. A sharp conflict over educational policy arose early between the English-using elites and the clerics whose role in children's education had roots in Islamic tradition. The conflict sharpened as soon as the hope of socialist, secular governance under Bhutto declined in the later half of the 1970s. The English-educated elites took a compromising posture towards the rising force of the clergy and organizations like Jamat-e-Islami. Like other post-colonial elites, they saw safety in giving way to many of the demands of fundamentalist forces, keeping a barricaded, local existence with global contacts and exit routes for themselves. The more they compromised, the greater the capacity of fundamentalist social forces to demand became. The loss of civic freedoms and liberal spaces speeded up dramatically after the end of Bhutto's regime in 1977. External involvement in Pakistan's affairs was an ongoing phenomenon, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan enabled the US to construct a more blatant reality in which Pakistan could be actively used for helping the mujahideen, militarily, financially and educationally. The expert help given by the University of Nebraska for the preparation of anti-Soviet textbooks presents a significant study for those interested in gauging the extent to which education can be used for ideological purposes.

In the process of recovery that began after the forced acquiescence to the post-9/11 US role in Afghanistan, the civic forces in Pakistan have gained some ground, but it is far from adequate to bring about deeper awareness of what Pakistan has done to Kashmir, let alone to induce a shift through an exchange of ideas, in India's awareness of the tragic enfeeblement of Pakistan as a nation sensitive to its civic needs. The younger generation of Pakistan does feel bewildered by what they know and the realization that there may be a lot they do not know. For them to make sense of Partition is a challenge quite different from what it is for their Indian counterparts. How the two countries have travelled from Partition to the bond of nuclear insecurity is as great a mystery for Pakistani youngsters, as it is for their Indian counterparts. The propaganda that Pakistani children hear about India's intentions does persuade them to see the nuclear bombs in Pakistan's possession as a source of security, though not as an adequate source. A student in Lahore asked me why India needed nuclear bombs if it was not afraid of Pakistan, reinforcing his point that Pakistan was afraid of India and that is why it needed a nuclear bomb. The fear of India remains, and it reinforces the historic insecurity that the Muslim elites in certain pockets of northern India had felt in the decade preceding Partition.

III

Perceptual History

In an interview published in December 2000, the late princess Abida Sultan, the Begum of Bhopal, who had migrated to Pakistan in 1949, said:

> The tension between India and Pakistan is because of their past. The Muslims came to the subcontinent as foreigners and were accepted by the local Hindu population. But the Muslims repaid them by dividing their homeland. I consider that a crime on the part of the Muslims, no matter what the reasons were. In my opinion, this is the main reason behind the tension between the two countries.[1]

Had I not read this interview in a Pakistani magazine, and had the opinion expressed been that of a Hindu, I would have found nothing significant in this quotation. For our purposes here, it is just as well that the point has been made by a Muslim, someone who is senior and secure enough to say what she believes to be true. Of course, it is possible to disagree with her, to say that she is old-fashioned, eccentric,

or communal. Also, one might proceed to find a rationale for her views in the life she led or in her personality. All these would be valid responses, and they might enable us to dismiss her views. Perhaps the most valid way to dismiss her opinion as being of no significance would be to say that she does not represent the common Muslim view. Most probably she does not, but does she represent, in a strange sense, a common Hindu view? If the answer has even a trace element of the affirmative in it, then we had better get prepared to argue whether there is such a thing as a *common Hindu view* of the past, especially of Hindu–Muslim relations and of Partition. If there is, perhaps the Begum of Bhopal absorbed or intuited that view during her life in India before migrating to Pakistan and before the awareness arose in her mind of what was going on in the subcontinent.

In the same interview she was asked whether she had any regrets about migrating from India, considering that the state of Pakistan had drifted away from the vision of its founder. Her answer was that she had no regrets, that she and other princely rulers who migrated were shown more respect and recognition in Pakistan than those who did not migrate received in India. Then she added: 'Whatever happened later has no link with migration and the creation of Pakistan.' She concludes her answer by sharing her theory about Partition. She says that Jinnah never wanted Partition; he only wanted to protect the rights of Muslims: 'Had the Muslim majority provinces been given autonomy, he would have been satisfied.' To substantiate this theory, she says: 'I am saying this because I was present on more than one occasion when the Quaid-e-Azam and my father had

discussions regarding the issues confronting the Muslims.' Then comes her conclusion: 'The Quaid-e-Azam accepted the idea of Partition as the last resort.'

We can easily criticize the Begum of Bhopal for essentializing the Muslims. Also, we can notice the contradiction between regarding Partition as a Muslim crime and, at the same time, asserting that Jinnah accepted Partition as the last resort, which would suggest that it was a crime committed rather unwillingly. But the point of quoting from the Begum's interview is *not* to enter into a long inquiry about the validity of her theory on Partition. There are any number of theories about Partition, and more continue to be invented. As it happens, resonances of her theory can be found in several recent, respectable volumes on Partition. However, it is not her reasoning that interests me, but rather the ability to delink a major decision of her life from her perception of the direction history took. Her statement can be read as a fairly common text of human experience. People do their best to live with what has already happened, leaving the truth aside, to be articulated for its own sake; getting on with things, though the forces guiding them look wrong and irresponsible. The reason cited by the Begum for the perpetual tension between India and Pakistan falls in the category of the irremediable, inasmuch as it has to do with a happening which was never attempted as such but occurred nevertheless, and with so much convincing force that she agreed to be guided by it. It is plausible to imagine that in 1949, when she left India, no one could foresee that in the coming fifty years Pakistan and India would remain hostile towards each other. The explanation of this hostility given in 2000 could not

have been considered in 1949, or else the awareness that Partition was a crime, as she calls it, on the part of the Muslims would have influenced her decision to leave India, and possibly reversed it. Of course, awareness is often hardly sufficient to avoid a decision. The point being made is that even the awareness of how Hindus might see Partition after its occurrence was not necessarily available in 1949.

It may be useful to remind ourselves that foresight about the future of Partition proving so tragic, expensive and irreversible was rare. Many, including leaders like Nehru and Jinnah, seem to have had reasons to believe that things would improve with the passage of time. And, if one goes by what happened in 1952, when the first cricket match took place between the two countries, we can say that things did improve rather soon. It has been argued that Jinnah was not fully conscious of the magnitude of the implications of Partition. This would apply even more evidently to Iqbal, who is believed to have inspired others to envision Partition, but did not live to see it happen. After Partition had occurred, many scholars and leaders continued to believe that Pakistan would come apart. Some upholders of this view felt vindicated when Bangladesh came into existence in 1971, although few of them have tried to explain why Bangladesh has any better a raison d'etre than Pakistan, and why its relations with India are not dramatically friendly. The idea that even what remains of Pakistan cannot be sustained continues to be popular. What precisely would happen when it will come apart has never been terribly clear, but such a summary end of all problems still tempts the imagination of a certain category of peace-lovers. We will return to this theme;

just now it suffices to notice that Partition has remained a live wound in the Indian national mind, which is exactly what the Begum of Bhopal claimed in her explanation of the tension between the two nations.

We are already into that hazy region of analysis where perceptions, and the frames which shape them, matter far more than ideas or facts. Any reasoned exploration of this kind of terrain makes paradoxical demands, such as the temerity to go beyond the discourse accepted for analytical writing as well as the good sense to realize that transgressing this border may defeat, or at least damage, the purpose for which one has undertaken this exercise. The use of the word 'Hindu' presents an appropriate illustration of this paradox. Abida Sultan uses it to describe the local population which 'accepted' the Muslims 'who had come to the subcontinent as foreigners'. If we agree that this is how ordinary—in the sense that they are not scholars or historians—people think and talk, we can derive some benefit from the Begum's point. If, on the other hand, we object to her use of the term 'Hindu' as a collective label for the 'local population', we recede into shadows which this analysis aimed at dispelling. As a descriptor of the people who lived in the geographical territories of present-day India and Pakistan at the time when invaders from the north-west came, the term 'Hindu' arouses the question: Did they have a collective self-identity as Hindus? Similarly, the use of the term 'foreigners' provokes one to ask what kind of meanings were associated with foreignness in the first millennium AD. For Abida Sultan, and for a vast number of people who think of Hindu–Muslim and Indo-Pak relations in such anachronistic frames of the past, 'Hindus'

and 'foreigners' are quite relevant as categories to understand the present and the recent past. How do they acquire their relevance?, we can confidently ask. Isn't the context in which nation states of the modern world operate altogether different from the one in which ancient or medieval societies related to each other? If we think along such lines, we would recognize that the Begum's way of looking at the past is quite ahistorical, a sign of poor education or lack of the ability to desist from applying abstract categories to deal with palpable matters.

Yet, her point has to be granted some validity. It arises from popular ways of looking at the past as a solid mass of collectively owned experience and memory. It is this unaccredited historiography of the popular imagination that the Begum's argument illustrates—even represents—in certain details. It can hardly be disputed that in the popular mind Partition has acquired the status of an archetypal metaphor. In everyday life, one is startled to notice its appearance in unexpected settings and ways. At times it is invoked to convey a sense of warning, or the necessity of futuristic wisdom; at other times as a comment on someone's ill intentions. The situation can be totally unrelated to Hindu–Muslim or Indo-Pak relations. The word 'Pakistan' has also obtained the character of a trope, conveying divisiveness. Thus, Kamleshwar's recent novel conveys a sense of apprehension regarding the tendency of further communal division in its title, *Kitney Pakistan?* (How Many Pakistans?). Numerous film songs have conveyed this apprehension over the years. But the term 'Partition' is more frequently used than 'Pakistan' as a trope of intolerance and divisiveness, perhaps because it

promises to convey the point without hurting personally. To say that someone is proposing partition is less insulting than to say that he or she is proposing another Pakistan.

I got an opportunity to analyse this decontextualized use of Partition as a pure metaphor in a formal discussion which was organized to find ways to restructure a large institution in order to improve its functioning and the quality of its work ethos. One proposal was for a two-part division, another one was for making three units out of the original unit. The latter idea was somewhat futuristic, in the sense that no specific function or need that a third unit might serve had yet arisen, nor could one identify members who might belong to the third unit if it were to be created. On the other hand, there was a clear rationale for recognizing two separate units. However, as the discussion proceeded, it seemed that the proposal for a three-way split had wider appeal. It was a bit mysterious why it seemed less threatening than a division into two. Responses to the latter suggested that somehow a two-part division would arouse animosity and conflict, whereas a three-part split would recognize and encourage diversity of interests. Then, without any reason, someone invoked the partition of India and Pakistan, saying that such a thing must never be tried again, even on a small scale. Not just the memory of Partition, but Jinnah's role as an architect of Partition, was also mentioned as something one must learn from. The message now became quite obvious, namely, that a two-way split must be avoided. No one found the reference to Partition mock-heroic or irrelevant. The general consensus with which the negative value of Partition was viewed indicated that the invocation of 1947 had served a purpose

that could not be understood in purely rational terms. It had created an instant community, a little India which was convinced that partitions only bring disasters. The Indo-Pak division had ceased to be a moment or process of history: it had become an example of wrong action, a metaphor that could be freely applied to any situation or context.

This anecdote is but a small reminder, though it can hardly be called a piece of evidence, of the multiple uses that Partition serves as national memory in India. These various uses can be understood by examining the assumptions on which popular as well as a considerable part of the academic knowledge about Partition is based. We can broadly distinguish three premises: one, there was no real reason for Partition; two, nothing good came out of it; that it was an unmitigated tragedy; and three, even the ostensible objective of dividing India was not achieved, thus Partition proved futile. The first assumption runs across the voluminous body of historical scholarship now available on Partition as so continuous a thread that one might as well call it the ruling paradigm of Partition research. There is no sign yet on the horizon that the paradigm is likely to get saturated or challenged in the near future. Not only historical scholarship, but also the considerable body of research writing emanating from disciplines such as literary criticism, political science, sociology and psychology shares the assumption that Partition was not inevitable; that it represented a failure of the social and political forces generated by the struggle for independence from colonial rule. This is also the main theme of school textbooks. The cruder ones—and there is no dearth of such school histories—portray Partition as the outcome of a

conspiracy between the British and Muslim communalists. Better ones avoid the suggestion of a conspiracy as such, but offer little by way of a rational explanation of why Partition occurred. The best explanation offered is that it occurred, or that the Congress allowed it to occur, because communal violence had reached horrific proportions and would have escalated further had Partition not taken place. But even this explanation is not meant to suggest that anything worthwhile came out of Partition, or that it was not an unmitigated disaster, which is the second assumption running through writings and research on the subject.

The Pakistani view of Partition is, expectedly, quite different. Not only does Pakistani historiography portray Partition as a rational outcome of the circumstances prevailing in the subcontinent in the 1940s, some scholars assert that Partition was a consciously pursued objective. School textbooks in Pakistan have taken the latter view, and barring exceptions, have propagated the perception that Partition symbolized the fulfilment of the destiny of South Asia's Muslims. In this manner, Pakistani school textbooks socialize children to believe that Partition was a great achievement though it was won at a great human cost. Both the assumptions underlying Indian historiography, that there was no real reason for Partition and that nothing good came out of it, are denied by Pakistani historians and textbook writers. And as for the third Indian assumption, namely, that even the ostensible purpose of Partition remained unfulfilled, the Pakistani perception partly agrees with the assumption but locates the cause elsewhere, not in Partition itself. The Indian view is that Partition failed to resolve the problem of communal tension, if that is what it was meant to do; and moreover, this failure proves that Partition was not a solution at all. The Pakistani view is that Partition was itself incomplete and unfair since it left the fate of Kashmir undecided.

It is quite remarkable that hardly any research in India has adopted a counterfactual mode to speculate with intelligent use of historical indicators what might have happened if Partition had not occurred. Out of the vast body of writing on Partition, I have located just one piece which deals with this question. This paper by N.C Saxena is worth summarizing, not only because it is unique, but also because it is so comprehensive.[2] He attempts to negotiate two major departures from the established Indian view of the causes and consequences of Partition. Firstly, he challenges the common view that the consolidation of a collective identity around religion is necessarily a negative, undesirable or strange development in a modernizing society. Saxena shows, by citing numerous comparative cases, that it is quite normal for religious identities to gain strength in the course of modernization under certain circumstances. This perception has been endorsed in many recent writings on modernization, and has aroused renewed interest in the post-9/11 context. The sociological point that the advent of modernity arouses both fear and confidence, even as the role of the lone individual is enhanced and sharpened, has received rather scant attention from the historians of modern India, or else it would have created a tolerant appreciation of the desire which arose in many parts of India when representational politics was first introduced, to use religious ties for political

purposes. For Saxena, the fact that this desire went as far as seeking India's division into two nation states need not deter us from finding it historically legitimate. He points out that the desire has not ceased to find political expression in divided India. Rather, the illegitimacy attributed to it has allowed religious majoritarianism to acquire political mileage on the basis of the argument that religious feelings are not the property of the minorities alone. Saxena analyses the different meanings that 'communalism' has acquired and he questions the contradictions assumed to exist between 'national' and 'communal' interests. He refers to the cases of several multi-ethnic countries to suggest that economic development does not necessarily dilute collective identities based on religion and language. The real question, he says, is how far and how completely do political and other institutions facilitate a rational negotiation of religious identities.

The second departure from conventional thinking made in this essay is more directly significant for Indo-Pak relations. Saxena attempts to hypothesize different scenarios that the Indian subcontinent might have faced had Partition been avoided. By analysing several counterfactuals, he proves that if Partition had not occurred, the consequences would have been more, not less, traumatic. This position is quite unique, presenting an isolated departure from the symmetry between left–liberalist or secularist and the Hindu right perspectives on Partition. The symmetry is rooted in the idea that Pakistan is an illegitimate child of the freedom struggle. It is illegitimate, from the secularists' viewpoint, because it symbolizes a denial of the highest ideals of the national movement. These ideals were articulated by the leadership of

the Congress in its fight against colonialism. Mobilization of people on the basis of their aspirations for freedom, equality and dignity constituted the struggle. According to the secular view, this struggle was vitiated by the communal agenda of the Muslim League, under encouragement from the British colonial powers. Hindu communalism was also a major threat to the nationalist struggle, but its consequences are regarded as being relevant mainly to post-Independence India's domestic struggle. From the Hindu right's perspective, Partition was an unmitigated tragedy which violated the unitary character of India's Hindu civilization. This perspective ignores the role of Hindu communalism in facilitating Partition; indeed, from the Hindu right viewpoint, the term 'Hindu communalism' is a contradiction in terms. Communalism, as an ideology of religious separatism, was characteristic only of the Muslim League, according to the Hindu right perspective. This viewpoint suggests that Muslim separatism was encouraged by the Congress, mainly by Gandhi, who pampered the Muslims, and also by secular leaders like Nehru who were alienated from Hindu sensibilities because of their Westernization. It is, of course, interesting how oblivious the Hindu revivalist line of argument is of its own 'Western' roots, especially in the matter of aspiring to give Hinduism a congregational character that Christianity has. Both the left–liberal and the rightist views of Partition are grounded in the belief that Pakistan's existence as a separate sovereign state is the outcome of the two-nation theory, and not of a complex set of historical circumstances. Both perspectives reject the two-nation theory, though for different reasons. The left–liberal rejection is based

on moral grounds; the rightist rejection is based on the perception that the Muslims of India are converts from Hinduism, and therefore in essence they are Hindus whose Muslim identity is a political manoeuvre.

It is hardly surprising that prejudice towards Pakistan cuts across ideological lines, and the discourse of peace that different political formations espouse is also uniform. A genuinely liberal perspective on Pakistan is nowhere in the offing, though there is a substantial liberal desire for peaceful relations with Pakistan. To overcome the stereotype of Pakistan, which is based not so much on nationalist bias as on structural prejudice in the framing of history, the liberal-minded Indian would need to reconceptualize the secular viewpoint, and this may prove a very demanding intellectual exercise. A reconceptualized secular perspective would highlight the feeling that the horrible violence associated with Partition cannot serve as the lone measure to assess the consequence that Partition had for the two sides. Apart from causing violence and horror, Partition also intensified the division that already existed from the late 1930s onwards between popular Hindu and popular Muslim mindsets. The former became a perennial resource for the feeling that Partition brought greater suffering for Hindus in that they lost both territory and lives, that the Muslims gained at the expense of Hindus. The popular Muslim mindset, on the other hand, acquired a sovereign national memory and narrative which underlined Hindu resistance to a fair deal for Muslims. The secular creed must engage with these rival mindsets, in the hope that an informed approach will eventually succeed in challenging them. The prevailing determination to ignore

these mindsets is a major impediment to Indo-Pak peace. A significant feature we notice in the map of the popular Hindu mind is the fear of another Partition at the behest of Pakistan. The apprehension that India can break up again feeds on the memory of Partition and the popular explanation for it in which the memory is wrapped. The memory is partly a cultural artefact with which modern education has refused to engage; but some forms of education have popularized it. Millions of people continue to believe that Partition was not inevitable, that it was a British conspiracy in which Muslims collaborated, and therefore they cannot be trusted.

The suspicion is deep, and Muslims have no choice but to live with it, perpetually struggling to prove that it is unnecessary. The fact that it is a daily struggle does not make it any easier. What makes it especially hard is the awareness that the 'others', namely the Hindus, may not notice or appreciate it. Why go through the bother then?—a Muslim who occasionally asks knows the answer—that there is no choice. The strain is like life itself: to be endured with the hope of festive relief now and then when the nation's mood is calm and consoling. In a typical classroom with one or two Muslim students, one sees this unending game of suspicion and reassurance all the time. In moments of strife, suspicion grows like grass after a monsoon; during uneventful days, the urge to reassure desperately starts to look meaningful. In the strange geometry of Indo-Pak relations, Pakistanis become remote hostages to the fluctuating social climate in which this game is played in India. As it is, the Indian state has a difficult task negotiating peace with a state which lacks stability and coherence in its different parts. The volatile social

climate within India imparts to the task a measure of risk too high to be ignored by political leaders, who must retain a popular mandate in order to survive. Pakistani leaders know this and often use the risk factor in the Indian initiatives to buy advantage and time. For the Pakistani leader, too, there is a risk of losing legitimacy by looking too eager for peace, but the risk arises more from the problems of managing a constellation of elites, including the all-powerful military elite, than from any nuanced democratic situation. The pervasive media, especially the Urdu press, act like watchdogs ready to pounce on any deviation from the fixed rhythm and rules under which peace with India can be talked about. The space in which the English press can manoeuvre peace grows and shrinks in terms, depending on the ability with which the military elite manage fundamentalist groups and the regime of violence that prevails in all spheres of life.

IV

Why Nobody Minds a War

Compared to war, the idea of peace seems uninteresting. In a state of conflict, the temptation to fight is far stronger than the rival temptation to live in peace. In fact, the latter is not a temptation in any real sense; it is only a wish with no hold or grip on our minds. The temptation of war is reinforced by a hundred devices each day, whereas the desire for peace finds no external corroborators in the everyday world. To begin with, whereas war always leaves wonderful stories behind, peace is dispersed in the daily affairs of life, leaving no specific story of its own. The *Mahabharata* would perhaps not have been written if Lord Krishna's efforts to bring peace had succeeded. Stories of war naturally inspire, and when they do, they successfully camouflage the gore that any war, even a brief war fought on a small scale, necessarily creates. The hero who fights bravely and kills ruthlessly is not supposed to remind the listeners of how horrible the scene in front of him looked as he fought. War stories do not carry the details of cold, dead or bleeding bodies, or of scattered body parts. In our times, the camera is capable of showing such details, but even the

embedded reporters and cameramen covering America's recent war in Iraq exercised restraint in this matter, anxious as they apparently were to sell the war as tolerable entertainment to a worldwide viewership. They acted like ancient storytellers, specialists in the art of constructing the narrative of war, ensuring that the listener does not feel revolted by the sensory details of violence such as pain, blood and screams. They saw to it that the viewer stayed focussed on the storyline, and did not deviate into thinking about it. In this sense, war stories were, and continue to be in their televised form, a kind of literature for the very young who do not associate killing with the feel and detail of death. When adults hear or read war stories or watch an assault on television, they regress into childhood. They lose the capacity to reason about the implications of what they are watching, and also lose the impulse to switch off when, occasionally, their feelings are revolted.

Management of the public perception of war is a significant aspect of the war industry. The focus is on delinking war from violence, in the daily news as well as in memory. A conscious effort is made to keep images and evocative descriptions confined to episodes of individual murder or rape. The scale at which murders and rapes occur in war remains hidden from popular awareness. In this enterprise of concealment, the state's civil–military apparatus and the privately owned media actively collaborate in ways which can seldom be scrutinized. One instance of this partnership should suffice. It has to do with Hiroshima, the only site of mass nuclear violence available to the world. The Museum of Peace is located at the spot where an American warplane

dropped the bomb known as Little Boy in 1945. Up until the 1980s, the museum carried a compelling signature of violence in the organization of its exhibits. In those days, when you entered the main gallery, you faced a large panel showing the faces of three children whose hair was on fire. As you moved forward through other painted or photographed images of horror, the eyes of those three children continued to haunt your mind. Sometime in the 1990s, it all changed. The museum got sanitized. Historical details of pre-bomb Hiroshima, explaining and justifying its choice as a target, and tame pictures of the atomic assault mounted on small computer screens replaced the earlier display. When I inquired why these changes were made, the staff told me that the tourist industry did not appreciate the museum, so it had to be made bearable. The effort did pay off. Whereas earlier one saw dozens of visitors weeping inconsolably outside the exit gate, one now noticed people consulting their guidebooks to decide where they must rush to next in order complete their tour of the city. Hiroshima is no more a memorial to terror. The Museum of Peace no longer raises the awkward questions it once did about war.

War also has the advantage over peace in that it serves, in its numerous variants, as a metaphor of life itself. It is frequently used in popular speech and writing to suggest the necessity, even the beauty, of struggle. In Third World settings, we also hear about wars on illiteracy, poverty, malnutrition and so on. All such usage makes war an acceptable solution which might even be attractive, given the completeness and speed of the relief it promises from an annoying problem. In that ability, war carries the value of modern medicine or

vaccines. This allied metaphor is frequently applied by governments and international development agencies when they announce their resolve to eradicate illiteracy, backwardness or poverty by a certain year. Whereas war, when used as a metaphor in everyday parlance, reminds us of life's problems and uncertainties, and of the need to fight on, peace is typically used in the context of death or life after death in the context of the soul. Used this way, it carries the essential feature of being permanent, which is what gives peace its main popular value. Repeated usage along these lines forms the view that peace is worth having only when it is long lasting; war is better than a peace which is frequently disturbed.

Thus, war comes across as a lasting solution in life, and peace a worthwhile thing to aspire for only in death, i.e., when it can be lasting. When I started teaching my course on peace education, this was among the first difficulties my students and I encountered while trying to conceptualize peace. We gradually learnt that for peace to have value in a living context, it must be allowed the flexibility of duration. Even if it is short-lived, we decided, we should cherish it, or else we cannot protect ourselves from the illusion of war as a lasting solution. The idea that peace must be valued even if it is momentary seemed initially disappointing, but as the course progressed, we realized how even a moment of peace constitutes a major everyday struggle for millions of people, and that it does serve a purpose. The experience of nation states is no different. War-weary nations hanker after a patch of peace even if the patch lasts no more than a few weeks or months. In that brief period, their citizens are able to enjoy

the small pleasures of life that the luckier citizens of other countries take for granted.

Peace is, of course, the declared goal of every war, and some wars do, at the end, offer peace. However, to regard peace as an outcome of war is to take a rather skimpy and remarkably ahistorical view of peace. To begin with, wars are seldom waged in order to establish peace or conditions conducive to peace. In older times, the rhetoric of war was far more transparent than it is now. Not one of the many wars that we have seen in the Middle East were fought without invoking the prospect of peace, justice and democracy. The recent invasion of Iraq by the US and its handful of allies was accompanied by an astounding design of supporting ideas and information. An ordinary American could hardly be expected to see through this vast smokescreen of words. Elsewhere in the world, only scholars and peace activists talked about petrol and regional control as the real reasons for the invasion, not democracy and justice in Iraq or peace in the Middle East. Ordinary people who depend on television for news had little access to such views. It is quite evident now that peace will be the declared goal of war wherever the developed or fully modernized nations are directly involved: their young, educated soldiers will never fight in the name of resources, hegemony, hatred, or domestic politics. Such mundane aims are now suitable only for the wretched fighters of pre-modern parts of Africa or the young recruits of fighting factions in Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The discourse of modernity has fully covered the interests of today's developed societies. We are compelled to turn to developing societies to examine whether peace can ever be an achievement of war.

In many parts of the so-called developing world today, we see what has correctly been called the 'new hundred year wars'. The main characteristic of these wars is that those involved in them do not want peace. Any possibility of peace is perceived by either one or more of the fighting sides as a sign of impending defeat. Even in its weakest form, peace is resisted and those who attempt to broker it are viewed as partisans. In the context of the conflicts we see today in the developing world, it is meaningless to talk about interludes of peace. What tranquility they offer is purely nominal, for it is used for higher level preparation for a future war. Preparation for war includes improvement in military technology, management strategies and scientific research for further advancement of military intelligence, surveillance, and weapons of mass destruction. All of this means greater expenditure on security, and mobilizing increased budgets of public money for war calls for more effective propaganda of insecurity. Democratic procedures need routine manipulation to create social insecurity, and the crafting of national insecurity requires the subversion of education and the media. And this is just a short list of the tasks that occupy warring nations or factions during interludes of peace.

The interlude of peace that India and Pakistan attained between the Bangladesh war of 1971 and the Kargil episode of 1999 presents as good an example as any. The thirty-year period was used by both nations to replenish their stockpiles of conventional weapons, and to acquire new ones. Both countries spent stupendous amounts of money to develop long-range ballistic missiles. How expensive this endeavour proved can be estimated in a rough, layman style with the help of the figures mentioned by the then prime minister Indira Gandhi in her Frank MacDougal lecture delivered in 1981 in Rome. She said that in terms of expenditure, an international ballistic missile is equal to building 3,40,000 primary schools or 65,000 healthcare centres. Her comparative data sounds accurate when we consider how rapidly India's systems of primary education and healthcare deteriorated in the last twenty years of the twentieth century, when India's missile technology was moving with vigorous swiftness from one successful project to the next.

The use of a long peace interlude to improve instruments of war is illustrated in an even more striking manner by the attainment of the status of nuclear powers by both India and Pakistan. The resources invested in this gigantic accomplishment cannot be estimated in terms of money alone. We are looking at a pool of different kinds of resources, each mobilized by the unique strategies required to obfuscate and destroy the alternatives competing for attention. The scientific, educational and political resources can be easily distinguished, but we must add cultural resources to complete the picture. Deployment of scientific and technological resources in the service of national security is common among modern nation states. For it to happen under a democratic policy calls for the construction of a positive ethos and consensus among the articulate sections of society. This kind of political effort is required for an enormous mobilization of educational and cultural resources. India and Pakistan illustrate the continuation of their pre-Independence stories of public mobilization in the context of these resources. The propagation of a divisive consciousness, which had begun in

the late 1930s, resurfaced in the late 1970s. Social forces representing revivalist nationalism regrouped following the lifting of the Emergency in 1977, and initiated a long-term project of turning Indian politics rightward. The Simla agreement between Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto after the Bangladesh war in 1972 became a matter of record; in the everyday world of social life, both India and Pakistan increasingly alienated each other. In Pakistan, the ideology of Islamization and engagement with politicized fundamentalism evolved into an anti-India cultural programme. In India, Hindu revivalism came centre stage by a cooperative effort of rival political parties and state media. The reopening of the Ayodhya temple occurred as an outcome of political consensus, and state-owned television under a Congress government helped build a positive ethos for the Ramjanmabhumi movement by showing a long series of Sunday morning episodes of the cinematized story of the *Ramayana*.

Thus the opportunity to build a peaceful relationship after the 1971 war was wasted away. Neither India nor Pakistan showed any signs of remorse for the war they had fought. Far from it, both used the war as a nation-building memory. In the case of India, it was a memory of triumph, to be commemorated later in a day of celebration on 16 September. For Pakistan, it was used as a memory inspiring the nation for a suitable revenge in the future. Neither nation spared a thought for the people of Kashmir, which had served as a key war zone. How Kashmiri society was brutalized by the clash of armed forces found little space in the media. Among the few sensitive portrayals of what the war meant for

Kashmir is a short story by Raghuvir Sahay, *Seema Ke Paar Ka Aadmi* (The Man From Across the Border).[1] It centres on a visit by a team of journalists to a border village in Kashmir that has been captured by Indian forces. The narrator notices piles of daily objects on both sides of the lane, and is filled with a sense of guilt on seeing a single pink plastic chappal worn by a little girl. Among the captured civilians is an old woman who cannot stop chattering, and an attractive young woman who has become an object on view.

Kashmir has been the key venue of all the wars India and Pakistan have fought. Yet, for different reasons, neither Indians nor Pakistanis can emotionally identify with the injury and pain that Kashmiri society has suffered as a result of providing the theatre in which the armies of the two nation states can fight. Why Kashmir's pain matters little to Pakistan is easy to understand. To most Pakistanis, Kashmir is merely a political symbol or goal, not a society with whose members the rest of Pakistan's national society has interacted. As a symbolic space too, Kashmir's natural beauty acts more like an object of the desire to consume. Its memory value for Pakistan is merely that of territorial deprivation. No amount of violence and destruction in Kashmir can arouse sufficient grief in Pakistan's popular mind for it to feel sorry for the Kashmiri people's suffering caused by wars with India. As the advertisement for a popular vegetable oil says, '*Kashmir par samjhauta? Hargiz nahin.*' Kashmir is the name of this brand of oil. The fact that the majority of Kashmiris are Muslims does not make much difference to this process of commodification, although Pakistan's Kashmir policy is built on this premise. Pakistan's national solidarity is woven

around the ideology of religion, but the ideology has barely sufficed to accommodate Pakistan's ethnic and sectarian struggles. Indeed, as the emphasis on the ideology of religion grew stronger, its capacity to contain ethnic aspirations and sectarian conflict declined. The image of Kashmiris as fellow Muslims in dire need of help is a relatively grander and more stable political rhetoric to have been invented in the erratic history of Pakistan's democratic polity. Given the record of indifference shown by the rest of Pakistani society to the problems faced by Pakhtuns and Balochis, who can argue that the suffering of Kashmiri Muslims evokes pain on any scale?

Why Kashmiri suffering evokes little pain in India is more complex. Its geography and demography are two important resources for any search one might make for an explanation. But the attrition of sensibility owing to a history of war and violence is an overarching factor we can easily overlook, mainly because this factor cannot be explored with tangible facts. If a certain region of a country repeatedly serves as an arena of war with another country, and then becomes a hotbed of domestic trouble, its value as a part of the psychological space that a nation's geography symbolizes can be expected to shrink. That is what seems to have happened in the case of Kashmir, but underneath this fate lies a more specific story. As a border state, it should be comparable to the North-Eastern states, which also carry the image of being a 'disturbed region' in the popular mind, their individual achievements and problems lumped together in an undifferentiated mess. But the stereotype of Kashmir is imbued with a unique bitterness which cannot be adequately explained solely with

reference to its geographical location and its disturbed ethos. In the modern world, geography intermixes with interests and images, more so than it has done at any time in the past. Politics, education and the media reshape geography in the popular mind, and Kashmir is a living example of this process. Education and the media disperse undigested bits of knowledge across a vast national space, and make politics look like a farcical mystery.

Stereotyping of social groups is one of the many unintended by-products of our democracy, especially of the electoral system. Prevailing cultural stereotypes are avidly utilized during pre-election strategizing and canvassing. Over time, these stereotypes get transmuted into stable, vote-gathering mechanisms. Kashmir's stereotype partakes of the common image that Muslims have acquired in the public imagination in the history of elections since Independence. That image portrays Muslims as a pampered people and Kashmir as a proof of that charge. Indeed, this stereotype of Muslims and Kashmir has served as the fulcrum deciding the relative destinies of the Congress party and its challenger, the BJP. In the hands of Hindu revivalist political forces, this stereotype has served as an instrument of discrediting the Congress and for vilifying Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru. The well-established use of Muslims as a vote bank gave legitimacy to this charge, but the Muslims were not the only vote bank the Congress used for electoral mobilization; nor is the Congress the only party to have done this. In the case of Muslims, the stereotype of being a pampered lot stuck because of the larger cultural ethos constituted by the urban middle classes, especially since the 1970s when avenues of

employment opened up in the oil-rich Middle East. The rise of the BJP's popularity over the 1980s can, to a great extent, be attributed to the success of its campaign to smear the Congress for encouraging Muslim separatism.

The campaign had a wide and diversified front. It included the evocation of Gandhi's appeal for justice and compassion for Muslims and Pakistan at the time of Partition, and Nehru's alleged hesitation to extend his secular policies and outlook to Muslims. More substantially, the campaign spread wild popular beliefs about Muslim demography. The growth rate of Muslims as a community has been passionately said to be higher than that of other religious groups, and the reason cited is polygamy, which is said to be widely prevalent among Muslims. The campaign also propagated a simple theory on Kashmir, that the Congress under Nehru was responsible for making it a problem by giving it a special status in the Constitution. From the early 1980s onwards, under Indira Gandhi during her final stint as prime minister, the Congress responded to the Hindu revivalist campaign by showing concern about Hindu sentiments, and adopting a series of measures to prove such a concern. The politics of Ayodhya, which shaped the national ethos between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, reinforced the popular tendency to stereotype Muslims as a self-centred people who have no consideration for others. Perceptions of Kashmir were directly affected by this development. It became, in the public mind, a sensitive border state inhabited by an ungrateful people whose suffering could be ignored.

In this long-drawn political process, the media has played a significant role by serving as a key means of mood-creation in the public mind and of keeping it volatile. In this respect, the electronic media has acted as an instrument of a new kind of social order which is hinged on immediacy and volatility. When served as evening news for consumption by viewers who have collapsed on the sofa facing their TV sets after the day's work, violence becomes a point someone has the license to score. The killing of militants in Kashmir reminds no one that these are young sons of mothers with names and addresses. Nor does the killing of army personnel by militants. The depersonification of killing by television is assisted by the peculiar knowledge that democracy has given to every citizen, that whatever is in the news is political, so the killed and the killers are together in a political game. However, in cinema too, Kashmir has received over the recent past a specifically tendencious kind of treatment. Cinema has made a serious contribution towards making Kashmir an area unworthy of sympathy. Kashmir had been symbolic of nature's ultimate gift to India; in recent cinema, its image has changed to that of being a beautiful land inhabited by an untrustworthy people. Films like *Border, Mission Kashmir,* and *LOC Kargil* have reified India's territorial border with Pakistan, reducing Kashmir to a war zone. Wherever its own residents figure, they are typically cast in roles that disturb the progress of the main story, which inevitably symbolizes India's national right to secure its borders with a neighbouring enemy state. This cinematic transformation of Kashmir has made a distinct contribution to the insensitivity which already prevailed towards the violence, indigence and suffering of the Kashmiris.

The brutalization of Kashmir's life as a result of the Indo-

Pak conflict is little known to the rest of India. Images and narratives of the pain or humiliation suffered by ordinary men, women and children—'the unspectacular violence of everyday life', as Humra Quraishi calls it—do not make it into the universe of the popular media.[2] It is widely accepted that most Indian media reports on Kashmir are based on official releases, civil or military. The focus is always on violent incidents in Kashmir. Reports on Kashmir's economic, cultural and educational life are extremely rare. Politics is the only sphere of normal life which wrests some space from the overwhelming focus on the incidents of violence. One can argue that it is so because violent incidents do take place quite frequently in Kashmir, so what is wrong if they dominate the coverage of Kashmir in the media? Two answers can be easily given. One, violence in Kashmir can be compared with violence in the North-East. The two regions are equally prone to violence, but the latter gets less attention, both in terms of space and follow-up, because it is erroneously seen as being less relevant to national security than militancy in Kashmir, and therefore has less news value. Two, news about Kashmir's economy, cultural events and education or health would offset the news about violence. If such a broader canvas of news applies to other states, why not Kashmir? Kashmir has now acquired a set image and role for the rest of India. Its image is that of a scenic land occupied by people who do not fully appreciate being part of India; and its role is that of supplying that element of insecurity on which all nation-building projects normally thrive. The fear that we are in danger of losing something valuable is common to nation-building, but it is far from clear whether it is essential.

It is the fear of an imminent loss of national freedom that makes war acceptable. Each nation constructs its insecurity in its own original manner, which is suited to its own peculiar ethos. The public responds positively to the rhetoric of insecurity when its diction resonates familiar themes and discourses. In the US, the rhetoric of individual freedom strikes the right chord in the public mind. The threat to individual liberty sounds real when a President invokes it in order to justify war against communism or terrorism. In the case of India, national independence and integrity act in a similar manner. The saga of freedom from colonial rulers has been used over the years to socialize the young into believing that India could lose its freedom and become a slave country once again. Never mind the absurdity of the idea that just as we were once ruled by Britain, we might one day be ruled by Pakistan. Incredible though it sounds, the fear of losing Kashmir has become symbolic of losing the freedom we gained in 1947 after such a long and hard struggle. Kashmir thus serves as an icon of the most fundamental fear we can have as a nation. Kashmir reminds us in a split second of cognition how fragile a matter national security is.

That Kashmir is a bleeding wound, that its people live in chronic pain caused by the violence that surrounds them, and the uncertainty that stares at them in every nook of existence is something that few Indians would care to know about or contemplate even if they did somehow find it out. Hardly anyone young and educated knows about Kashmir's political history and the aspirations it espoused at one time for the transformation of its old social order. Popular knowledge consists of the solid awareness that Pakistan is

involved in Kashmir, and that its involvement has become possible because Kashmir is largely Muslim. That awareness is quite sufficient by itself to keep the rest of India unsympathetic to Kashmir's misery. By reading Urvashi Butalia's compilation of essays by women we can gain a modest experience of the pain and horror that ordinary Kashmiris have now suffered for more than a decade.[3] The essays speak in different styles, some with academic restraint, others with journalistic ease, still others with a personal flair, but the reader's discomfort gets intolerable after a while in the encounter with any style. One realizes that the only option one is left with in order to protect one's dignity as an Indian national and regain the ability to get on with the day's chores is to return the book to the library. I toyed with the idea of quoting an extract or two here, so that my readers could get a sample of the discomfort I felt. I gave up this idea because I realized that it would do grave injustice to the women who have lost everything that counts to keep a human being sane. Numbers do not matter when one deals with grief, but in this case, the numbers are also staggering. The women who have suffered humiliation, destitution, and for whom hope has died, are in the thousands in Kashmir.

Why don't they matter to 'us'—those who reside in Delhi or in other parts of functioning India? Apart from other answers which push us towards theories in geography, psychology, and sociology, an additional valid answer, one suspects, is simply that they are women and Muslims. We are accustomed to their suffering and we have found rationales justifying our indifference. Women's pain looks routine in a patriarchal ethos, and when the suffering women happen to be Muslim, their assumed backwardness helps. When all this is pointed out in order to prove the allegation of callousness, the response one usually gets is that 'We did not know how bad things were in Kashmir.' This kind of justification transfers the blame to the media, for we are dependent on it. Once this transfer of blame has taken place, the justification of ignorance and indifference becomes accommodating and comfortable. The media are what they are, and they are neither fully free nor interested in covering the everyday pain of Kashmir. To cover it would be politically confusing and commercially stupid. Kashmir is safer as an object of indifference than as a subject of serious investigation by the media due to the boredom it would cause. Barring its mountains and lakes, it is like Bihar, an unnecessary consideration for an interesting, successful life in an Indian metropolis.

Kashmir has now become a ball made of a special weave of wool and live wire. Anybody who cares to spend a little moment of time to contemplate the ball realizes that it can explode anytime. Small explosions occur with a frequency that is high enough to keep us sufficiently worried, woolly-minded, and helpless to let the status quo tactics of both nation states continue. No solution is in sight because no one is concerned enough to look for a solution any more. Violence has gained the status of a ritual; only the daily media feel that it is their duty to cover the ritual as part of a routine. Every now and then a human story appears, with a box item highlighting the number of individuals killed by militants and security forces—sometimes together, at times separately—and many others who have died in custody or whose absence

is now long enough to justify the belief that they have been killed. Then, there are numbers of children who have become orphans and women who have become widows. Typically, such reports are accompanied by the information that the state machinery has failed to make adequate provisions for the destitute, the orphaned, the widowed, the elderly. Non-governmental organizations have come up to serve all such conflict-affected people, we learn. And what about the rest of the people, one feels like asking. Are they not conflict-affected too? On them we have reports about mental illnesses, the inability of the medical professionals to cope with the scale of the challenge, and so on.

This is a glimpse of what we might hope to obtain of knowledge if we show or develop an interest in Kashmir. The ball of wool and live wire, in the meanwhile, is being constantly negotiated by officials on both sides, thrown at each other, unravelled successfully and wrapped up again, in a rhythm tuned to political events of varying levels of significance. And, if we look carefully, we may notice a second neighbour, China, playing the Kashmir game in its own unique style, fine-tuned to the subtle goal of incapacitating India for opening its mouth on numerous Asian affairs, including the environmental and cultural devastation of Tibet. Kashmir's own state machinery, in the meanwhile, is reduced to becoming a local custodian of chaos. The gestures it makes on any issue of civil significance are small, invoking pathos from those who have the patience to watch. A suitable example is the offer of admission into the Delhi Public School for ten meritorious children of Kashmir. When the chief minister announced this offer at a public function, he was implicitly expressing concern about the education of Kashmir's children who attend the bare, impoverished schools run by the government in the middle of violence and fear. The government cannot reform the system or change the ethos in which schools function, and children are growing up all the time. So it offers state-funded admission into the protected, ostensibly safe walls of a public school for ten Kashmiri children selected to escape the anxiety of common living because they have shown promise. Not to be left behind in this contest of gestures, Pakistan has offered 100 scholarships to meritorious Kashmiri youth in institutions of higher education, or what remains of them after decades of politicization and decay.

The situation in Kashmir remains unpredictable. There are times when it is said to be improving; at others, it is described as vulnerable. The difference between the two has to do with symptoms like the number of bomb attacks or the figure of casualties in a given period. Alternatively, the return of tourists is treated as a reliable indicator of Kashmir's health. No one seems to care about the life of an average family or the state of relations between communities. The multicultural fabric of Kashmir is giving way, though it is not unresurrectable as yet. However, global perceptions on the Kashmir problem are gradually moving in the direction of the familiar contradiction of modernity, i.e., the tendency to exaggerate and reinforce differences while propagating universal values. This is the direction of territorial reorganization on ethnic lines. Chronic violence has already initiated the process, and it is mistakenly seen by many as a solution to the Kashmir problem. As two colonized players of the game of modernity,

India and Pakistan have proved incapable of exercising inventive imagination. Identity-based reorganization is an essential part of the new wave of resolving conflict. Its application in Kashmir will be the ultimate act of modernization, reminiscent of that initial step called Partition. It will be an explicit gesture of logic, and its consequences can be predicted. Yet the appeal of modern, instrumentalist solutions may well override the predictability of an unwelcome result. The appeal forces us to stare at the idea of modernity, take a breath deep enough to allow time for recalling both the idea and its historical unfolding.

Modernization is synonymous with development as far as the colonized Third World, of which Kashmir is a part, is concerned. If development is to be seen as a project, it has certainly failed in Kashmir. The usual excuses, like the pressure of population, lack of political awakening and the paucity of economic resources do not apply in this case, for Kashmir had them all. If it failed to develop into the Switzerland of Asia as it is described for tourists, the reason lies in its geopolitical location, which has made it a victim of continuous war. The question we must ask is whether this war in and over Kashmir is consistent with modernity. The answer to this question cannot be sought in the context of Kashmir alone, for the fate of Kashmir is more common than we might like to believe. Kashmir is just one among the many sights of the 'new hundred year wars' of the modern world, fuelling its international politics, arms trade and media businesses. All such hot points are stories of a lost or threatened identity. The quest for acceptance and protection of identity is the heart of many cases where modernity has failed. Identity

represents that weak point where projects of modernization have been known to suffer major setbacks and have become responsible for the spilling of blood in amounts rather difficult to measure.

Modernity promised the reign of rationality, built on the pillars of literacy and planning for industrial production. Identity posed a ghost-like challenge to this house of modernity. In large parts of the colonized world, science was believed to have exorcized that ghost, leaving people free and relieved of their urge for community and identity, to live a life of self-fulfilment. That is the way, they said, it had happened in Europe, and a repetition of the story was predicted, and prayed for, in the Third World. That the story was interrupted in the heart of Europe, leading to the killing of six million people in the name of identity, was said to have no lessons relevant for modernizers elsewhere. In the early twenty-first century, engineers of modernity are looking upon community identities as a potential means for re-ordering conflict-ridden parts of the world. In Iraq, an example of secular modernity in the Islamic world, an ethnicity-based political solution to the problem of post-Saddam governance has been preferred. Media agencies of the highest level of sophistication use terms like Sunni and Shia to describe putative, viable communities. The usage assumes that the two groupings are essentially different. This assumption was believed to have the capacity to contain the war that started with the invasion of Iraq. Now this assumption is believed to have the potential to guide post-war care for Iraq. Its dependence on rationality is what has cut it off from sanity. Rationality permits unlimited

opportunity for the exercise of instrumentalist solutions, such as America's active assistance to the mujahideens for its project to topple Soviet control of Afghanistan, then its own invasion of Afghanistan to fight Islamic terrorists. Such exercises comprise acts of freedom without responsibility. Dorfman and Mattelart had correctly linked earlier acts of this kind to Walt Disney's creation, Donald Duck.[4] With his companions, Donald freely moves from one beautiful island to the next, leaving the used ones dirty, devastated and unfit for picnics. This perception and mode of behaviour are completely rational, and at the same time insane.

V

A Problem of Assessment

To assess and compare India and Pakistan as national projects is difficult, because the two projects are intertwined. Their separateness in terms of ideology is as glaring as their commonality in terms of aspirations, economic development and modernity. It is easy to compare them on the basis of one or the other kind of global pecking order. For instance, one can marvel at the irony that India and Pakistan occupy the lowest slab in global ranking in literacy and per capita income, but the highest slab in import of weapons from wealthy countries. Alternatively, one can dwell on the reasons why, statistically, India is doing somewhat better in education while Pakistan is somewhat better in nutrition and in controlling deaths during pregnancy and delivery. Such comparisons do serve a purpose: they provide a much needed diversion from the unending news of hatred and hostility. The tireless propaganda one sees in Pakistan against India, especially against our policies in Kashmir, would look insane if we did not have our own weekly Pakistan reporter on the official channel to remember and compare. Our press has a somewhat better record, but

television, radio and cinema compensate for it. However, the press is just as devoid of human stories from across the border as is the electronic media. The occasional UN-sponsored comparative statistic of underdevelopment makes for a positive sound byte, clearly inadequate if the task at hand is to imagine a future when India and Pakistan will actually start worrying about their women and children, and stop craving the latest weapons acquired by the other from the US, UK or France. Assessed on the basis of the usual indices of welfare, the two nations reveal no major or interesting difference.

For a deeper assessment we can turn to the ideas which give them vitality as modern states. Looking at Pakistan, we do not have the convenience of a documented constitutional vision because of the long time taken to draft the first Constitution and the short life it had. Pakistan appears to have moved so rapidly and wilfully away from the vision articulated by Jinnah in his 12 August 1947 speech, that it seems pointless to now assess its journey as a sovereign nation on the basis of that vision. Jinnah's own advocacy of the two-nation theory, which permitted him to plead for Partition, confuses us further. If the invocation of 12 August was sincere, then Partition was unnecessary and, given its human cost, rather ill-conceived. In his speech, Jinnah had asked people of different religions to feel free to go to their respective places of worship. This would have meant equality of all faiths and separation of personal faith from loyalty to the state. If this was going to be the idea of Pakistan as well as the idea of India, where was the need for Partition, one might innocently, wistfully, yet legitimately inquire. The

moment we slip into such an inquiry, we commit the error of missing the point of history, which is to treat any theoretical invocation of the kind Jinnah made as merely one aspect of the phenomenology of events.

The chain of events which mark the making of Pakistan is relatively easy to put together; to judge the role of ideology in shaping this chain is somewhat more demanding. Many Indian scholars have traced the chain without taking an objective view of the ideology; indeed, for an Indian scholar of Partition with secular credentials, it would be awkward or strange to view the ideology backing the formation of Pakistan with objective interest. Scholarship and proclivity go together, and for understandable reasons. The fact that Pakistan was founded on a basis that any 'secular' Indian scholar would call 'communal' is self-evident. The discourse of secularism demands that we reject the use of religion as a factor of nation-building. The rationale for making this condition stringent is domestic, but once accepted, it cannot be softened for application across the border. From the Hindu nationalist perspective too, the birth of Pakistan does not deserve to be understood except in the emotional style suitable for application on successful conspiracies. The orbit of people who regard Pakistan as a bad, irrational dream which will pass sooner or later is quite accommodative. It permits us to appreciate certain kinds of similarities between the perceptions of the worth of studying Pakistan we find among adherents of secularism and its critics. It is not very surprising that the number of Indians who have maintained a scholarly curiosity towards Pakistan has remained rather small. And not just individual scholars; institutions devoting resources to Pakistan

studies are also remarkably small. No example of such indifference towards a hostile country, that too a neighbour, can be found in any other nation with as developed an apparatus for social research as India has. If there is a match, it can only be found in Pakistan, but it can qualify as a match in this respect because its academic apparatus is so small and has been in a damaged state for quite some time. Our mutual indifference can only be seen as an emotional response which has got institutionalized over the years. Institutionalization is evident from the dearth of courses or syllabi which might help the young in either country to learn about the other. Glorifiers of a great common heritage are aplenty on both sides. It is the updated scholar of the two specific, separate nations who is absent.

If this indeed is the case, then we can hardly hope to find an impartial measure to assess the two nation-building projects. Both would have to be separately assessed on the basis of discrete criteria grounded in their self-perceptions. So, for Pakistan, only a Pakistani perspective would serve the purpose. A sense of insecurity is doubtlessly the single most important element in any narrative of Pakistan's birth. Historical writing and literature both point us towards the late 1930s if we are looking for the seeds of Partition, but the discourse of insecurity and fear goes all the way back to the late nineteenth century, to the emerging prospect of representative governance. The Pakistani school textbooks I have analysed in *Prejudice and Pride* trace the roots of Partition in the latter half of the nineteenth century when, in the context of declining Mughal power, new socio-political arrangements were taking shape, arousing a sense of

uncertainty and fear among the Muslim elite. Political management of that fear by means of devices like separate electorates worked for a while, but eventually, as Independence came closer, the competitive politics of identity went beyond the containing capacity of strategic management and exchange. Historical as well as literary evidence points to the 1930s as the watershed; before that a great effort was on to forge an accommodative identity, and from the late 1930s that earlier project looked hopeless. *The Heart Divided* by Mumtaz Shah Nawaz (first published in 1954, five years after its young writer's death in an air crash) offers a fictionalized, everyday account of the 1930s as a period marked by political transition and social break-up.[1] Read as an autobiographical account of the 1930s, the novel subtly explains the dramatic shift its narrator—a brilliant young Muslim woman activist—makes in her loyalty from the Congress to the League. It also shows that historians make a serious mistake when they seek the reasons for Partition in the familiar triangle of the Congress, the Muslim League and the British. The story brings out the partition that had already occurred by the late 1930s in the heart, that is to say, in the universe of emotions and personal relations. As a sociocultural phenomenon, modernity has the tendency to be angular and explicit. In its early spring, it presented to the Hindu and Muslim elites an impossible demand—to mix more deeply or to separate. By contextualizing the political drama of the late 1930s in the frame of emotions and reactions, Mumtaz Shah Nawaz allows us to view the final phase of the national movement more deeply than almost any other record of the period. She also enables us to trace the gradual consolidation of a mindset

marked by the apprehension that Hindu nationalism would induce, after Independence, a desire for revenge for the many centuries of Muslim dominance that was more real than the Congress leadership was ready to concede. Secularist scholars continue to dismiss that fear as a mistaken feeling.

The fear that Hindu raj was in the offing, that it would wilfully ignore and eventually stifle Muslim aspirations, first grew socially among the elites and soon found the means to get expressed politically. How deep the fear was, and genuine too, was something that the Hindu elites could hardly be expected to gauge. The political breakdown that occurred between the Congress and the Muslim League following the 1937 elections has received serious attention from a few historians, but there is still rather insufficient recognition of the social and cultural divide between the communities which had already existed, and which grew rapidly deeper in the final phase of the national movement. The reluctance to recognize it has something to do with the ideological commitment one notices among liberal minded Indians (not all, of course), to denying religious identity as a valid source of emotions. However, a deeper reason for this reluctance to recognize the post-1937 deepening of the Hindu–Muslim divide lies in the search for tangible causes that rationalist scholarship continues to make despite copious evidence which suggests that the speed of events may on its own have shaped their direction in the final decade of the national movement. And the speed of events became increasingly difficult to negotiate. Division among perceptions of the impending future is evident from the controversy of which Gandhi's proposal for 'Nai Taalim' (new education) became an easy

victim. Barring the effort made by the German political scientist Joachim Oesterheld, there is no scholarship of a historical nature which acknowledges and probes the role that the contrary interpretations of Gandhi's proposal for change in education, especially in the context of its medium and context, played in alienating Muslim public opinion, especially in the Gangetic belt.[2] With the help of a careful reading of provincial assembly debates on Nai Taalim, and linking these debates to the changes taking place in the larger political scenario of the late 1930s, Oesterheld has been able to establish that Gandhi's radical proposal for educational reconstruction fell prey to and widened the deepening social divide between Hindu and Muslim leaders and their respective public audiences.

Once again, it is not the agency which is important, but rather the structure of the situation and the interaction that occurred among its constituents. Understandably, one may find it hard to believe that anything to do with children's education could become politically so sensitive and consequential. When I first came across this topic, I found it hard to recognize that as benign and well meaning a proposal for change in education as the one Gandhi had put forward could be seen as something quite as evil and ominous as community leaders among Muslims in several parts of India made it out to be. In retrospect, one can say that the only flaw in Gandhi's proposal was that it came ahead of its time. The logic of association gave it so diabolical an image in the eyes of many community leaders among Muslims that Zakir Husain, Gandhi's chosen leader for this scheme, could not fight the opposition to Gandhi's scheme despite his energy and courage.

The logic of popular Muslim perceptions of the Nai Taalim, or the Wardha scheme, as it was popularly called because it was announced in Wardha, is worth exploring a little further. Let us contextualize them in the economic and political ethos of the late 1930s with the help of accounts like the one M. Mujib has provided in an autobiographical memoir.[3] The Congress victory in the 1937 assembly elections and the prospect of impending land reforms caused a sense of anxiety among the landed Muslim elite of the United Provinces. The new, younger leaders of the Congress were unfamiliar faces, with a voice even more unfamiliar in the specific context the language these leaders used and espoused— namely, a form of Hindi which was quite distinct from Hindustani, with its generous Urdu blend. The isolation and worry felt by the landowning Muslim elite found a somewhat dramatic vent when it was noticed that Gandhi's educational proposal had no place for religious instruction. Gandhi's own explanation for this absence was that the prevailing styles of religious practice and instruction were prone to encouraging conflict. Muslim critics saw this argument as a subtle device to weaken Islam. Modernist ideas, like emphasis on movement through music and dance, were misconstrued as a scheme to teach dance to Muslim girls. As if all this were not enough to destroy any hope of Nai Taalim being given a fair hearing, community leaders linked it with an unrelated development in the Central Provinces whose Congress chief minister, Ravi Shankar Shukla, appealed for land which could be used for starting village schools he chose to call 'Vidya Mandir'. The name resonated in already incensed Muslim ears as proof of a Hindu conspiracy. Gandhi's image as a devout Hindu and

a votary of Ram Rajya made the conspiracy theory appear sound.

These attributes sound amazing to us today, but they sounded quite credible to a nervous elite who saw themselves as a vulnerable community in the United Provinces. Mujib says in his memoir that the elite and their insecurity provided the ground on which the demand for Partition sounded like the only option left. It was not just a case of the heart divided, as Mumtaz Shah Nawaz has called it, but also a case of the mind divided. On one side of the divide was the self-confidence of the Congress, that swaraj was drawing near; on the other side was the fear among the Muslim elites, and later the masses, that swaraj was going to be Hindu raj. The discourse of fear took the form of a vision which had elements of nationhood, ready to be assembled into a formula for mobilization of the public mind and negotiation with the colonial masters. Hindu revivalism had by now become a political force inside as well as outside the Congress, and the ability of its leaders to contain it had proved inadequate for the task. The challenge these leaders faced at the hands of both varieties of revivalism was identical. It was the challenge of keeping religion and polity apart. For Iqbal, whose personal vision is believed to have provided the intellectual basis of Pakistan's nationhood, the secular idea of separating polity from faith was against Islamic principles. 'Is it possible,' he asked in his Allahabad address of 1930, 'to retain Islam as an ethical idea and to reject it as a polity in favour of national politics in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part?' This question had validity, for Hindu revivalists too, but the context in which they were struggling for an

ideological victory was different. The context in which Iqbal's question was heard in 1930 was beginning to get suffused with apprehension. By the end of the decade, apprehension had matured to the point where the Muslim elite—landed and educated—felt compelled to take a decisive step towards the unknown consequences of separation.

Iqbal's intellectual journey in the last phase of his life (he died in 1938) provides us with an amplified glimpse of what was a common experience among educated Muslims. Having mooted a vaguely worded idea in his Allahabad speech of 1930, Iqbal continued to waver about what it might mean. Like so much else in his writing and life, the suggestion he offered in the speech he gave as president of the Muslim League in Allahabad was tacit. It is hardly surprising that it remains a matter of debate whether Iqbal wanted a partition of the kind that occurred nine years after his death. In his letters to E.J. Thompson (edited by the Late S. Hasan Ahmed), he reflects on why his idea was quite different from how it was being perceived, and from similar-looking ideas floating at the time.[4] His letter of 4 March 1934 suggests that he felt uncomfortable about being seen as a protagonist of 'the scheme called Pakistan'. His own idea, he says, was no more than to suggest the creation of a Muslim province with 'an overwhelming population of Muslims' in the north-west within the Indian federation. Iqbal's views continued to be shaped, it seems, through the 1930s, by the emerging political circumstances and the state of his own feelings. The prospect of elections in 1937 could hardly have given him hope for a society frequently torn apart by violent riots. He had little faith in franchise-based democracy; indeed, he

perceived the introduction of democracy as an invitation to chaos in an 'undisciplined and starving' country. For Muslims, in particular, he anticipated nothing but destitution unless they were governed with the help of Islamic law applied with 'care and judgement'. For this to happen, political and administrative exemption from the democratic model based on secularism and universal franchise the Congress leadership espoused was necessary. This is why Iqbal felt so convinced in the final year of his life that a territorial provision, where Muslim majoritarianism could prevail, was the only option left. When he died in April 1938, the march of events to follow the Quit India movement could hardly be imagined. Nor had Pakistan, as a name, become a political programme for Jinnah. Yet, as his letters to Jinnah give us a wide enough window to see, Iqbal's mystical mind had seen a tormented future for the country he had once described as 'Saare Jahan Se Achchha' (The best in the whole world). In the last phase of his life, he felt genuinely disturbed about the prospect of Hindu raj. His hope that Islam would go through a great, positive experiment in South Asia looked increasingly unrealistic to him in a unified India. Though he couldn't clearly envision the contours of a division, he felt a division was needed.

On the other side of the religious divide, the educated, upper caste Hindu elite of Maharashtra and the Vindhya-Gangetic plains were crafting the language of cultural nationalism in response to their own anxieties and dissatisfaction with the character that the freedom struggle had acquired by the 1930s. One major source of anxiety was Gandhi's magical leadership and the threat it symbolized to

the Hindu social order. Gandhi's style and nuances were not the same as Jyotiba Phule's or B.R. Ambedkar's, but the intention was the same: to liberate the downtrodden castes from the yoke of upper caste hegemony. Its generalized effects were guaranteed to cover other social institutions, especially patriarchy. As an ideology, Hindu revivalism promised to alleviate the fear of social transformation, and initiate its own variety of reform which would not rudely touch the beliefs on which caste hierarchy and patriarchy were based. It also presented a solution to the other annoying thought, that even after India had gained independence from the British, it would continue to compromise with Muslims. In the semantic universe of Hindu revivalist ideology, there was just one meaning of justice: Hindu domination after Independence. This meaning assumed a palpable 'Hinduness' and the permanence of its antagonism with regard to Muslims.

In summary, the separatist movement which led to the formation of Pakistan was inspired by anxiety. If this analysis of the formative spirit of Pakistan, especially its anxiety driven core, is correct, then it would be quite appropriate and fair to assess the Pakistan nation-building project by asking whether it has relieved Pakistan's citizens, especially children, of fear. The obvious answer is 'No'. Pakistan continues to be haunted by fear. This is not something we Indians can grasp, except as a ground for ridicule, laughter or boasting, depending on our particular ideological disposition and on how submerged we are in India's positive self-image. That the fear of India may form the deeper psychological reality in which some of our immediate neighbours live would be an outrageously ridiculous thought if it ever happened to

occur to most of us. The fact is that a fear of India is an organizing principle of Pakistan's identity—so much so that the young are actively socialized to imbibe this feeling. When in a discussion with class IX girls in a school in Lahore I asked, 'Why did Pakistan develop a nuclear bomb?', a girl replied with the impatience characteristic of fourteen-year-olds: 'Don't you know we are scared of India?' So should they be, many Indians would say, including quite a few in state services. In Pakistan, the standard adult behaviour is to deny any fear of India. Liberal Pakistani opinion has the awareness that India would rather keep Pakistan within its range of influence than attack or swallow it. This kind of saner summarizing contributes to peace-building of a sort, but ignores the popular mind, which lives in memory and myth. It is interesting to ask why Pakistan cannot overcome its fear of India.

Pakistan was envisaged as a home for the Muslims of South Asia, a place where they would feel safe and free to realize the ideals of Islam. An ideal Islamic state was what Pakistan was expected to eventually become, a utopia illustrating Islam's capacity to guide human beings to behave as children of God, as practitioners of qualities like impartiality, selflessness and honesty. Jinnah's vision of a country where the minorities would be generously tolerated, even respected, and left free to practice their faith and traditions, is not incompatible with the idea of an ideal Islamic state. Pakistan's history since Independence and its present reality offer little room for any doubt about the enormous difficulties it has faced in holding on to the visions of Iqbal and Jinnah. These two icons have remained supreme and

isolated in the state's pantheon. Of the two, Iqbal's face evokes greater questioning about the violence-prone and intolerant society Pakistan has become. Jinnah's face has greater reassurance to offer, or so it looks to the visitor wherever the two portraits stand together. My favourite place to reflect on my own response to them is the Lahore railway station. Somewhat uniquely built, with a staircase leading to the platforms which today look wastefully vast (because the number of trains departing is so small), tell the story of a busier past. The staircase is almost dark, but the huge portraits of Iqbal and Jinnah seem to speak of a great promise, a dream; Jinnah's pensive face conveys the fatigue of a lonely soldier who retained the dream and then, in the moment of realization, discovered how exotic it was. Decades later, it looks as if the difficulties in realizing the dream outnumber the positive forces. Between the clergy and the civil society, there is a deep conflict over everything. As Jamal Malik has shown with frightening clarity in his book *The Colonization of Islam*, the clergy have been effectively pushing, since the late 1970s, the liberal English-educated elite to rapidly renewed, narrower borders of self containment.[5]

The tug of war between these sections of Pakistani society has been quite visible in education. The Westernized elite have control over their exclusive, expensive schools, but little else. The influence of the Islamization policies of the Zia regime on the curriculum of state-run schools went so deep, that seventeen years after Zia's death it remains intact. The madrasas are, of course, another story. The mullah and the maulvi have been actively used by the armed forces to seek popular legitimacy for their political and civic role over the

recent decades. The educational institutions run by the clerics were militarized to serve the American cause in Afghanistan. The implications of this development have proved expectedly deadly for civil society. The self-destruction of Pakistan's higher education is perhaps more tragic than the Islamization of children's education, for it signifies the draining of intellectual resources needed to undertake any rebuilding of the nation's independent spirit. More than any other intellectual leader or scholar, it was Iqbal who represented that independent spirit. He offered a commentary on Islam which, by any standards that can be applied to philosophical reinterpretation, is original and challenging to the institutionalized tradition of reflection in Islam. A country whose universities are dying can hardly uphold and carry forward the legacy of Iqbal, much as it cherishes it, and has so far succeeded in at least preserving it in an iconic sense. But then, one might say, the pain that universities are suffering in Pakistan is not unique. We can see symptoms in many other parts of the colonized world, including India. Indifference towards new ideas and intolerance towards others who are bright but think differently are common in university life in India too. The only difference is that the brain drain has not affected India as much as it has Pakistan, given our larger size. In certain fields, Pakistani universities are now so fully drained that there are no teachers left to teach those subjects; in others, a modicum of routine teaching and research activity remains.

For Jinnah's legacy, the battle for survival has proved grimmer. If Jinnah wanted a secular state, marking a distance between religious life and polity, then Pakistan's history over

the past four decades shows a determined progress in the opposite direction. Jinnah's dream was of a country where minorities would feel safe and free to practice their religions, but the state of Christians and Hindus provides sad evidence of the helpless fate of minorities. They neither have security nor a sense of equality. That their struggle for equal and dignified treatment is going to be a long one is proved by the difficulties they face in every step required for upward mobility through education and employment. But within Muslim society itself there are cleavages far too deep and prone to violence for the normal instruments of civic order to be of much help. The state of women too signals despair. The case of Mukhtaran Bibi, who was gang raped for the purpose of revenge, is not a one-off instance, except with reference to the superhuman courage she has shown in fighting her oppressors through rational means.

Pakistan's educated elites and present day policy makers are perhaps aware of this. One symptom of their awareness is Lok Virsa, a national museum of folklore in Islamabad which is dexterously structured around women's life. Lok Virsa was inaugurated in 2004. Most people you meet in Islamabad say that they have not seen it. Some evince a general awareness of its presence on the city's outskirts. It is highly unlikely that you will find anyone who will force you to drop other engagements saying: 'Listen, you must spend a few hours at Lok Virsa. There is nothing like it in the whole world.' Educated Pakistanis, including those who work for the government, are not the kind of people who would ever say that Pakistan has created something unparalled in design and execution. They are convinced that everything new in

their country is mediocre and the old things are neglected and crumbling. So how can Lok Virsa be anything unique? Well, that is precisely what it is. No museum of ethnology— I have seen quite a few, including the ones in Osaka and Berlin—has the breathtaking range of artefacts or the splendour of colours, or the sophistication of design that Lok Virsa has. The visitor is fed a feast of voices and images of communities which the stereotype of Pakistan we carry cannot accommodate. Not just architectural, musical and graphic forms, but the ways of conceptualizing the divine and worshipping represented at Lok Virsa convey the personality of a nation which secretly cherishes its cultural diversity.

Is this Pakistan real, one asks as a foreign visitor, or is it a show window? Even if there is more truth in the latter guess, Lok Virsa signifies a desire which has not died despite terribly inconvenient circumstances. As an Indian, one reads in this desire the continuation of a South Asian layer in Pakistani self-identity. Despite the officially constructed identity, this layer has kept alive a yearning for a romantic rural spontaneity and recognition of diversity. The fact that Lok Virsa is dedicated to women suggests that Pakistan's elite, howsoever poor their track record in human rights may be, are aware that Jinnah's project of building a modern Pakistan faces a tough challenge in the context of women, their right to justice, and the acceptance of their humanity. Equally tough is the moral and legal struggle to contain the alienation of minorities. Whether Pakistan is capable of reconciling its historical legacy as a nation born on the basis of religious separatism, with its socially diverse character,

remains a big question. If we decide to agree with those who believe that Jinnah was a deluded man who allowed his personal anger to shape a disastrous vision and divisive politics, we can see no hope for Pakistan. Nor can we, in that case, see any point in understanding Pakistan, especially why it has failed to overcome the anxiety which led to its birth and got imprinted on its temper, with the aim of learning to live with it. On the other hand, if we see Jinnah's life and politics in the context of a social and cultural world driven by the modernist craving for identity, then we may see some sense in the Pakistani nation-building project and hope that it will become free of its original anxiety and gain self-confidence despite its many weaknesses and failures on several fronts.

Measures to assess the parallel Indian project look deceptively less difficult to locate at first, on account of the availability of a Constitution to guide governance. One can propose that the vision of India sketched in the Constitution can serve as a valid measure to assess the Indian national project. If we use the word 'modern' to refer to present day India, we are tempted to say that modern India represents a break with the past, hence the parameters of the break can be used to assess the success of India's modernization project. An immediate challenge to this argument comes from the fact that India was not born at the time of her independence from British rule. It can be argued that unlike Pakistan, which has a distinct date of birth, India is an ongoing entity, both nominally and in substance. It would be rather easy to treat the standard symptoms of modernity to assess India, and many have been doing just that, consciously or otherwise.

We too can go this way, and judge modern India by applying the recognized yardsticks of modernization such as the scope for the exercise of individual choice, civic awareness, and the space available for reason in politics. Even as we start imagining what the outcomes of this assessment will be, the anxiety grips us that our impatience to judge India too soon, given its long, pre-modern history, may do it serious injustice. India's age seems to be a relevant factor and if we acknowledge this factor, we concede the point that Independence does not constitute a true break. It would be a justifiable question—whether Pakistan's formation constitutes a break from its pre-modern past. Obviously it does not; indeed, Pakistan fully shares India's pre-Independence past, though it may prefer to render that past into a history which looks quite different from India's. In that case, our assessment of Pakistan's nation-building project on the basis of Jinnah's dream of modernity is valid only to the extent that we can match this assessment with one for India on the basis of the dream of modernity and development depicted in the Constitution.

In both cases, a special factor appears to deserve attention as a ground for assessment. In the case of Pakistan, this special factor is its identity as a nation whose makers escaped India's attempts to resist Partition. In the case of India, the special factor is its constitutional commitment to the protection of cultural diversity and freedom of faith, notwithstanding Partition. If India is to be assessed on the basis of this promise, the case of Muslims is more relevant than that of other religious minorities. Compared to other religious communities, Muslims occupy a special politico-cultural space in India, and the fate of secularism as a creed of

governance depends critically on how Muslims feel and fare in different parts of India and in the varied spheres of modern life. Similarly, although Pakistan's relations with other countries, especially the Islamic nations located in the Middle East, in addition to the all powerful United States, make a significant difference to Pakistan's political economy and internal cohesiveness, its relations with India have a greater and unique significance. By the same token, though we have strong relations with the vast gamut of countries in the world and our conflict with Pakistan does not matter all that much for our global standing, peaceful relations with Pakistan are more important for us, socially and politically, than with any country including China.

More than half a century later, Pakistan continues to treat India as a Hindu country and refuses to take India's claim to being secular seriously. Pakistan educates its children quite explicitly to suspect Hindus and the country where they live, and it feels vindicated when Hindu–Muslim riots break out in India, for they chip away at India's claim to be a secular country. The view that Muslims in India live in penury and isolation is common, and a theme reflected in quite a few memoirs written by Pakistani commentators after their visits here. I got a tiny, unexpected taste of this feeling some years back when, after crossing the border in the Delhi–Lahore bus, I heard the waiter serving in the Pakistan Tourism office say, assuming that I was Muslim, 'We are poor, but at least we are free.' The picture of India's domestic scene apart, the Pakistani view of the future is framed by the stereotype of India as a country of Hindus who are described in school texts as devious, crafty, and untrustworthy. Despite history,

which offers no record of India attacking Pakistan, the latter's policy is anchored in the supposition that India, being Hindu, wants ultimately to end Pakistan's separate existence. Despite all its military preparedness, and the possession of nuclear bombs, Pakistan lives in a state of fear. The 'reality' of Pakistan's fear (and it is hardly surprising that Indians do not appreciate it) is derived not from any experience or evidence, but rather from a deeper source which lies and lives in its prenatal national memory. The fact that the Pakistani state felt so remarkably comfortable negotiating peace during the Hindu right regime might look like a paradox, but if we stare at it for a moment we gain a familiar insight. Dealing with the 'other', whom one knows only in terms of a stereotype, looks easier and without risk, particularly when the other behaves in ways which are consistent with the stereotype.

Pakistan's stereotype of India came alive and true when Gujarat, known for its tolerant and trade-oriented culture, sank into barbaric chaos in the spring of 2002. The Gujarat riots deeply injured India's image of itself, and others' view of it as a society which appreciates cultural plurality. These riots were particularly hurtful because they eroded the common faith that modernization and development would strengthen secularism. As an economically and educationally advanced state, Gujarat had acquired the status of an alternative model in relation to Kerala, whose weakness lay in the fact that the spread of education had failed to trigger sustained economic growth. The sheer brutality and scale of the Gujarat riots and the putative complicity of the state machinery in the breakdown of law and order loudly

conveyed the sense of a major crisis in society and state. It was not, of course, the first time that riotous killing was allowed to take place for several days. This had happened in Delhi in 1984 when thousands of Sikhs were killed in bestial ways following the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Shocking as anti-Sikh riots and the role of the government at the time were, the crisis caused by the Gujarat riots of 2002 is more palpable because the pogrom staged in Gujarat had a distinct ideological and preparatory background.

India's secular frame was shaken and mauled by the violence sustained over several days in Gujarat. Subsequent political developments have furnished a breathing space, which can be used to contemplate why India's secular polity is so vulnerable. At least one source of this vulnerability is India's hostile relationship with Pakistan. Though it is obvious that India *can* carry on without changing the primary character of this relationship, the vulnerability of India's socio-political climate will remain and deepen if relations with Pakistan do not significantly improve. Of course, Pakistan's inner struggles are also a major factor in the prospects of Indo-Pak peace, but the fluctuations Pakistan might go through are all predictable to a considerable extent. Sadly, our responses to those fluctuations are also terribly predictable. A positive break in time and relations can be imagined only in the context of the hope that at least one side might act in an unpredictable manner.

Following the parliamentary elections held in the summer of 2004, initiative and authority at the Centre did return to the secular elite, but their ability to exemplify a secular outlook which non-elites can share remains limited. There is an

argument that Indians are secular by nature; a subset of this argument is applied by cultural nationalists to claim that Hindus are, by virtue of being Hindus, secular. Both arguments suggest that nothing much needs to be done to achieve the constitutional vision of India as a secular society. To say the contrary, namely that secularism is an ideal which calls for a deep cultural and attitudinal change and struggle, sounds more plausible given that religious separatism is common and results in frequent eruptions of tension and violence. The secular elite do acknowledge that secularism is a goal, achievable but difficult because it calls for social transformation along the lines indicated in the Constitution. The secular elite are, unfortunately, saddled with some major hindrances though they have sustained the urge to transform the nation towards making it modern, and free of communal strife. For the secular elite, the term 'communal' continues to mean the opposite of 'secular'. Whatever its intellectual depth, this binary has restricted the range of secular activism, both in the sociocultural and political spheres. In the former sphere, secularizing programmes avoid any engagement with religion.

A powerful section of India's diverse elite treats religion like an elephant whose presence in the room must not be mentioned. Highly educated and creative though this section is, it feels content to use the space the elephant does not occupy. The secular elite live in the middle of relentless religious rituals performed by ordinary men and women daily, but finds little meaning or significance in the religiosity of the majority. Indeed, the religiosity of the masses is perceived merely as a sign of their backwardness. Those among the elite who regard secularism as a substitute for religion see

little merit in the qualities people display as they negotiate life's vicissitudes with the help of whatever spiritual fortitude religion provides. To the secularist, all religiosity is irrational.

This kind of secular extremism stays firmly negative and cynical towards not just religious ritual but religion itself, even towards the study of religion as a form of scholarship. It is hardly surprising that the secular elite have failed to contain the force with which an emerging rival elite—whose agenda is to treat religion as a basis for mobilizing political support—have attempted to gain popular loyalty. The communicational reach of the secular elite has been rather significantly dependent on English. They neither have an urgent reason nor adequate linguistic instruments to leaven their insularity from the rural masses and the urban poor. They often don't know what is going on below or around. Even the manifest material crisis of the peasantry escapes their attention; the subtler phenomena of cultural erosion and insecurity remain remarkably immaterial in the secular elite's field of vision. Gujarat is a prime example. More than a decade-long, assiduously carried out preparation to polarize Gujarat along communal lines by instilling hatred and suspicion towards Muslims remained invisible to English-speaking India. Gujarat carried on serving as a symbol of development and modernization while a medieval mind was being nurtured among large sections of its population, including children. When the riots erupted, everyone who is supposed to know what is going on, including social scientists, expressed surprise and disappointment.

Symbolic of India's vulnerability, Gujarat reminds us that economic development by itself is no antidote to India's

internal conflicts and turmoil. It also tells us how deceptive the common indicators of modernity can be. Consumption of goods and services, literacy and schooling are regarded as the means which raise public consciousness. The scale of riots witnessed in Gujarat, and the involvement of groups as disparate as the urban middle classes and certain tribal communities, show that symptoms of modernization have little to do with social cohesion and its sustainability. The absence of remorse, or even regret, is further proof that the cultural meanings of modernity and development are either altogether vague or unrelated to the social vision of the Constitution. Not just Gujarat, India in general continues to subsist as a society where crowds can be mobilized for violence and destruction. This can hardly be attributed to the prevalence of poverty, though the reported reality of most riots would suggest that the poor are the majority of those killed. There is a cultural void underlying the ease with which the public can be mobilized: a sense of break which seeks dramatic redressal by collective dramas of victimage and killing. Battles for identity are as characteristic of modern India as the rise of a pan-Indian national awareness. Perhaps it is somewhat unfair to single out India in this respect, for identity skirmishes are common across the world, and the so-called developed world is no exception. However, India's case is specific because a conscious effort was made in our Constitution to preserve the legitimacy of diverse collective identities even as the individual was assigned inviolable dignity and power in the legal and political spheres. Despite this creative compromise with the idea of the individual, the possibility of mobilizing people by invoking a sense of threat

to one or the other kind of collective identity has remained alive. Pakistan was born as a result of one such massive mobilization, but its search for a national identity has yet to attain maturity. Identity struggles internal to India are perhaps not quite comparable to the ones we see in Pakistan, but the volatility they lead to in the public sphere is not dissimilar.

To the extent that both Indian and Pakistani nation-building projects continue to look vulnerable, though on quite dissimilar scales, we can grant them a modicum of parity. They, however, actively display a far greater degree of parity under a daily programme sanctioned at the Wagah border check post. A brief but well rehearsed and consciously dramatized text of parity is enacted every evening in the presence of a crowd on either side. By any standard, it is a unique event bordering on the bizarre. The two national flags are lowered before the gates are closed for the night, in an elaborate ritual which reaches its high point when an army officer from each side walks in goose steps to make an eyeball contact with his counterpart. The point of this official ceremony is difficult to judge; but its daily enaction tells us that the past has not yet receded into history in either country. The past is alive, with the pain and anger of Partition still available as a resource for shaping the present. The evening show at Wagah proves that the nation-building projects of India and Pakistan were, and still are, at least partially dependant on each other.

VI

Inventive Modernity

The history of colonization intercepts the idea of modernity, and this interception has not stopped in the era of globalization. Colonial conquests gave Europe the power to characterize the world according to its own frame of mind and idea of culture. By European and American standards, the colonized countries continue to be poor though they are now free—even their middle classes are poor by those measures. If we permit poverty to be judged, and allow plans to reduce poverty to be pursued in accordance with the norms and interests of the hegemonic rich, the endemic conflicts and violence we see in many parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America can only continue, enhancing the scope of global trade in arms, big and small. The manufacturing nations who directly profit from this business, both in terms of capital gained and the numbers of people saved from unemployment, do have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict. For this reason, their concern for peace in pockets like Kashmir, Afghanistan, Nepal and Myanmar, and their efforts at peace-building in endemically bleeding places like Jerusalem, will necessarily have an element

of ambivalence. But the impatience one sees these days to use community or ethnic identities as a means to reorder boundaries and settle conflicts is historically familiar. After making their profits or accomplishing their political mission, the powerful like to leave at the earliest, and don't mind leaving a mess behind. Partition was a classic story of this kind of hurry.

For the colonized, the responsibility of finding their own solutions includes the decision to stop acting as guaranteed buyers of arms from the rich. This change of role is perhaps harder to expect than the one we implicitly ask the sellers to make when we cast doubts on their concern for peace. The business of arms is, after all, an integral part of international aid, much of which is for humanitarian and, therefore, unquestionable causes. Aid for development under conflict-ridden situations forms a vicious cycle. Post-9/11 US aid to Pakistan, for example, has been coming with the explicit expectation that a substantial proportion of it will be used for the purchase of arms. Military supplies from the richer nations to the so-called developing nations are inextricably embedded in development aid and do not peep out to the embarrassment of signing parties. It is quite unrealistic to expect that an aid-receiving country can stop being a buyer of weapons manufactured by donor countries. India is now said to be capable of sustaining its own development in many areas, yet it remains an aid recipient in as basic an area of development as children's education. Pakistan's dependence on foreign aid is even more serious. Neither country can be expected to stop being a client of development aid and military equipment in the foreseeable future. The link between

economic aid and military trade should impel us to ask why development has proved so ambivalent; and why modernity has been so deceptive.

The idea of development continues to be in business and its latest mutation, 'alternative development', promises not just equality and justice, but peace as well. Over the last two decades, it looked as if development would become an obsolete concept, that the contradictions it was facing were far too glaring to be missed. These contradictions had to do with the distribution of sacrifices and benefits associated with it. Typically, the poor made the sacrifices and the rich collected the benefits. At a deeper level, the contradictions of development were rooted in the association between development and modernization in the late industrializing countries. Were these countries heading towards modernity of the kind that post-Enlightenment Europe symbolized? The question became increasingly difficult to answer following the 1960s as modern despotisms surfaced in several developing countries, some of them with the approval of powerful developed countries, particularly the US.

Another contradiction emerged in the context of technology. Does it allow the exercise of human choice, featuring alternatives, or was it independently advancing from one form to another, leaving no room for choice? On the answer to this question depended modernity's claim to be guided by faith in science as an exercise of free inquiry. In the so-called developing world, the established way of linking science, technology and modernity increasingly implied a passive spectator's role for the majority of the population. Spectacular uses of scientific and technological modernization,

pursued with the help of the state's might, brought about a slow wrecking of the environment, culture and self-confidence. In several mega-projects of development, it became obvious that the rural population, especially if they were tribal, had no real choice, and that they could expect no justice from institutions symbolic of modernity. In region after region the chaos caused by civil strife and invasive war, displacement and environmental degradation, became difficult for the local apparatus of the modern state to hide or handle, despite help from international donor and lending agencies. Referring to the link between the rapid advancement of technology and a chronic state of war, Ursula Franklin says that the social and political need for an enemy is deeply entrenched in the real world of technology as we know it today.[1] Following the end of the Cold War and before the War on Terror had been planned and announced, Franklin had predicted that a new, credible long-term enemy would be found in order to keep public funds flowing towards war technologies.

Finally, the claim that modernization would erode the grip of religion lost force and meaning. Identities based on religion remained alive despite the propagation of secular rationality by modern states. Actively anti-religious states like the Soviet Union failed to obliterate the appeal of religion, while the United States never concealed its religiosity while professing rational modernity. After the 9/11 attacks it became unabashed in its suspicion of Islam, and Western civilizations were in a state of conflict. This neo-conservative perception is trying hard to cover its tracks after America's inability to hold on to Iraq has become evident, but there is no sign of a conceptual advancement in judging the place religion might

be legitimately given in the regime of modernity. Had there been a sign, it would surely have emerged in China, a late and enthusiastic entrant to the club of the orthodox modern, where the Tibetans are fighting a gruesome battle to protect a culture based on religion.

The idea of alternative development promised to make development more sensitive to the oppressed, to cultural communities, and to the environment. The idea was to limit the power of the state by ensuring people's participation and a transnational assertion of human rights. After competing for nearly two decades with the mainstream idea of development, the idea of alternative development faced a new challenge from the neo-liberal discourse of the 1990s, which gave a radical edge to the role of the market in the context of globalization. For a while it seemed that all previous ways of viewing economic progress and social change were now outdated, that both state-managed development and alternative development were things of the past. The new doctrine was to let markets expand and cover every human activity, including knowledge, teaching and healing. Extremist individualism and privatization were proposed as the real alternatives to development. However, the speed with which the obituary of development (and alternative development—its double) was written in the 1990s proved an illusion, and before anyone was ready, development was back—both as parlance and policy. It had been reincarnated in the context of peace.

The renewed, post-9/11 argument is that development is necessary for reducing conflict. In substance, this therapeutic approach is not altogether fresh, but its specific application

as a means of bringing about global peace is novel. In the case of the Indo-Pak conflict, the instrumental value of development attracts many who believe that speedier economic development and increased trade would enhance the chances of peace between India and Pakistan. There is obvious substance and the capacity to make immediate sense in this view. If India and Pakistan as nation states start focusing on education, health, transport, and the other everyday needs of life, they would someday have a more enlightened public, capable of demanding greater rationality from their respective governments. Also, if the two rivals decided to collaborate in meeting these everyday needs of their people, the challenge will become easier and less afflicted by a shortage of funds, considering the reduction in military spending. This kind of positive thinking no doubt offers hope, but if we examine it to any depth, it does not reveal any reason to take its promise seriously. Are we arguing that greater material prosperity brings greater rationality, seen in terms of an active interest in peace and distaste for war? Where in the present-day world can we find the proof to say that with any confidence? The engineering of prosperity in the modern world is linked to the engineering of war. It is not easy to distinguish the technologies of war from the technology of the everyday needs of a modernized public. To be prosperous and equipped with the most lethal weapons humanity has ever known has become one and the same thing. Also, to become rich by manufacturing and selling weapons and poisonous means of control has become legitimate. Indeed, extortion of the poorest nations of the world by making them buy the latest weaponry manufactured in

Europe and the US has become an acceptable norm, unworthy of notice in the burgeoning scholarship on peace.

To look deeply at development as a factor in the story of Indo-Pak enmity, we need to return to the implications of clubbing it with the nation state by calling it 'national development'. We also need to study the relationship casually assumed between development and modernization in former colonies like India and Pakistan. In the case of these countries, development became 'national' during the 1960s, and the context was identical, mainly the exigency of defence in war. From the vantage point of the mid-1960s, when the two nation states clashed for the first time over territoriality, the first decade of independence from colonial rule looks like a dreamy span of time when definitions were fluid and the power of the state was an aspect of its nature, rather than something external to it, to be pursued and displayed for its own sake. Policy shifts in many areas, including agriculture and industry, testify to the change that occurred in the first two decades of independence. An unusually clear glimpse of the change can be gained from two state documents pertaining to a relatively slower domain of response to needs, namely public education. No two documents reveal the contrast between the 1950s and the 1960s more sharply than the report of the Secondary Education Commission, written in 1953, and the report of the Education Commission written in 1966. The first focuses on children's development, the second—literally, going by the title, as well as the substance—on national development. The earlier formulation of what education could do was obsolete by now. Education had become, by the time the latter report was drafted, a key

component of the identity that dominant classes were forging in order to distance their destiny from that of the rural poor. The nation state was now perceived as an object of development rather than as a means of fulfilling a moral vision of society in which justice—and not the law-and-order machinery—would form the basis of peaceful living.

The continuity of the colonial arrangements too must be recognized. The fact that both India and Pakistan evolved into modern nation states in a colonial context places their capacity to define themselves under great strain. Despite the enormous intellectual struggle of Gandhi and Tagore in India, and that of Iqbal in Pakistan, to find alternatives to the narrow nationalism characteristic of Europe, both countries veered towards it in the post-war world of the 1950s. Pakistan's drift was particularly sad if we view it against the backdrop of Iqbal's bold plea for an experimentalist Islam. He had dreamt of a nation where Islam's promise of freedom and justice would be reborn. That Iqbal's nation sank so readily into the vortex of Cold War politics looks as (if not more) disappointing in retrospect as India's inability to sustain its leadership of non-aligned countries. Perhaps there was no choice; more likely, there was not enough time, given the message of Hiroshima and the continued dominance enjoyed by colonial powers. In a world designed to convey the respective territories of the two super-annihilators, the new nation states could hardly expect to get more time than what they actually got for deciding where they belonged in terms of loyalty. The only point that was not clear was who among the classes or social forces available in the post-colonial social landscape would carry out the functions of the modern nation

state, identifying with it, and making it the object of development policies. In India, that became clear after the Chinese aggression in 1962. In Pakistan it had been clear all along, but the struggle over state ideology lasted till the mid-1970s.

From the mid-1960s onwards, the pursuit of India's modernization and progress became a simpler task than it had been earlier. The struggle for independence had brought about a vast intellectual fermentation which included a sharp, multidimensional debate over the nature of progress that India would make as an independent nation. The voice of Gandhi in this debate was undoubtedly central, both in terms of its originality and the attention it got from both his supporters and opponents. Gandhi's idea of progress was articulated in an undivided India; therefore it can be seen as a legacy for both India and Pakistan, even though he may not be an acknowledged member of the national pantheon that Pakistan has built in its young minds, and has only a symbolic, rather lifeless, though tall, presence in the Indian pantheon. Gandhi proposed a critical reflection on the European idea of nation-building as a necessary prerequisite for designing the future of India. In *Hind Swaraj*, he offered an example of this process, and we should see no reason why it cannot just as well be called *Pak Swaraj*. Read in this broader sense, its message a century after it was written is clearer than it might have been at the time of its writing, namely that India—and Pakistan—must invent themselves with their own social and cultural resources.

Gandhi's greatest concern was to avoid an exclusively materialist definition of progress. He noticed that such a

definition was implied in the history of the industrialized, wealthy, and globally dominant West, and it is hardly surprising that his critique of materialism comes across as being simply anti-West. In fact, his anxiety for the West was as great as for India, and he felt that the search for a moral basis to progress was more urgent for the West because its losses had been greater. The argument of *Hind Swaraj* sounded unacceptable and rather ludicrous to many when it was first written, and the situation cannot be any different today; yet, in our despairing search for peace between India and Pakistan, it can serve as an important resource, simply because a hundred years of history have made its point easier to prove. Deciphered in the light of Gandhi's own life and political style, the central message stands out: self-restraint offers the best non-violent strategy of fighting the oppressive force of materialist progress. However, to absorb this message we first need to overcome the sense of the absurd it arouses in the educated reader's mind, by addressing global issues with elementary examples from everyday life. Swaraj, or self-rule, is Gandhi's truth, and its meaning extends well beyond political independence. It invites us to revisit the accepted view of modernity in the light of experience. Revisiting does not mean rejection. For Gandhi, the common sense idea of progress and modernization deserves to be contemplated with self-confidence and freedom: neither rejected nor accepted, but redefined for the sake of higher and more universalistic goals. The importance of not getting stuck in a given perception of human destiny, howsoever tempting its promises and howsoever powerful its sponsors may be, is what we learn from *Hind Swaraj*.

This message is not dissimilar from what Gandhi's eminent contemporary and intellectual colleague Rabrindranath Tagore conveyed in *Civilisation and Progress*. The two men differed on crucial matters, such as the implications of non-cooperation as a political strategy and the validity of science as a means of inquiring into nature. However, in their responses to the post-Enlightenment European view of progress, they showed remarkable commonality of perception. In *Civilisation and Progress*, Tagore uses the term *Dharma* to denote 'the essential quality of a thing' and the term civilization as the 'expression of man's *Dharma* in his corporate life'.[2] This meaning enables him to challenge the absolutist idea of progress as a gathering of wealth which was promoted by European colonial powers. Tagore's argument reveals that the pursuit of wealth for its own sake is destructive to togetherness and human unity. Two examples are cited: one is that of a child's loss of his desire to share, and of his creative spirit, after coming in possession of an expensive, imported toy. The other example describes villagers refusing to accept money for the water they have fetched with considerable trouble on a hot day, from those passing by in cars. The point driven home is that the essential quality which makes us human consists of our capacity to relate to those unfamiliar to us, and to realize our ideals in others. This is what Tagore's *The Religion of Man* is all about, and in several of his works he juxtaposes this religion with the other, dominant religion of the modern world, namely nationalism, to show the latter to be a variant of possessive corporatism and, therefore, capable of being destructive of humanity.

Seen from Gandhi's perspective, peace has become as much

of a consumer good as war, and this is why those selling the instruments of war are also the vendors of peace. This degeneration of peace implies a grave challenge to our capacity to talk about it in a way that neither trivializes nor romanticizes it. If peace gets commoditized, or is turned into a product like any other we can buy or consume, the first thing we would lose as a result of this transformation is our ability to resist well-peddled definitions. As a commodity, peace could mean a calm patch of space or time and the means to enjoy it. It would become a variant of entertainment. A golf course created by clearing forest land or villages does offer peace of mind to its users. So does a beach where tourists in search of distraction can access drugs and children are forced into prostitution. Peace in this commoditized form is little different from entertainment. It is useful to see this similarity, for we know the meaning of commodified entertainment only too well. As something dispensed by mega-companies and governments, entertainment brings temporary relief from the drudgery of routine, but it takes away the individual as well as social resources of self-renewal and well-being. Even as people become dependent on the entertainment industry, they become increasingly less capable of organizing their daily lives by themselves.

The monopolization of peace by powerful nations will have similar consequences, some of which we have started to see, following the invasion of Iraq by the US and the UK, along with a few others coaxed into cooperation. The US is not only the post-Cold War world's sole superpower, it is also the world's biggest manufacturer and seller of weapons. When it talks about peace, it means peace-keeping with the

help of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. When it offers peace to warring nations, the offer includes the expectation that America will help both sides to maintain parity in their ownership of the latest weapons technologies. This is precisely the story of US interest in Indo-Pak peace. To Pakistan, the US offered an umbrella of protection as early as the 1950s; the context then was the Cold War. Now, when the Cold War is over and India's military relationship with the Soviet Union has lost meaning, America's defence aid for Pakistan has been directly aimed at helping it maintain parity with India in the name of peace-keeping. A new scenario has surfaced in the wake of America's latest war initiative on terror. The context in which war is being fought across the world in many sites and in different ways is complex, for it includes the diffuse global march of footloose capital. New alliances are being formed in the desperate hope of winning a local battle, or holding on to regional warlordships. India's recent acceptance of closeness to the US belongs to this class of processes. If it is serious and meant to last, the peace-thinker Johan Galtung said at a lecture in Delhi in December 2005, let us pray for good luck on joining a sinking ship. Since Pakistan is a significant ally of the US in the so-called war against terror, a part of which is being fought inside Pakistan, it is possible for someone to argue that military aid to Pakistan is meant to help it fight terror, not India. Such an argument, plausible as it is, misses the point that US economic interests are served by weaponization of Third World countries, no matter which specific war they are expected to fight. The argument also distracts us from noticing how ludicrous it is to relate weapons to specific wars or

earmarked enemies. Like junk food and soft drinks, weapons can be consumed anywhere, anytime. But then, even junk food and drinks are treated by some as potential peacemakers in a globalizing world, the argument being that brand names transcend and weaken national boundaries.

Underlying this approach to peace, which commoditizes it and thereby synonymizes the preparation required for war and for peace, is the continuity of the colonial idea of development as a process whereby the colonized would become like the colonizers. To ensure that the once-colonized nations have no original vision of their future would be the ultimate proof of the success of the colonial project, now in a new phase. In the shape of national development, the project entails constant and unquestionable enhancement of military prowess as a goal in itself. The nuclear bombs now owned by both India and Pakistan should be seen in the context of their colonial history.

By pursuing the path of nuclearization in their military preparedness, India and Pakistan have testified that they do not possess any original vision of progress or development. What vision they have is derived from the global nuclear powers, which include the imperial powers of yesterday, the new imperial powers of today's world, and an aspirant to imperial status, namely, China. The lack of capacity to invent an original vision of progress displayed by both India and Pakistan is, of course, nothing special: it is merely one more example of their dependence on derivative policies originating from their colonial conditioning. However, the absence of any popular discomfort in either country against the nuclearization of an already overgrown war machinery

indicates a larger, more practical difficulty in the path of peace. This has to do with the nature of the everyday ethos in which the public mind dwells in India and Pakistan, and the folly of tightly pinning our hopes afresh for peace on popular goodwill and initiative. Such a hope is often expressed on both sides, especially when a period of peace is to be inaugurated. In such moments, articulate elites on both sides invoke the numerous shared bonds of culture with the same characteristic ease with which, in a season of heightened hostility, they ignore these bonds and focus on an essentialized India and Pakistan, serving as a mere grammatical subject in sentences like 'India wants to swallow Pakistan' or 'Pakistan wants to dismember India'. The common man and woman of the two countries lives in an ethos reshaped on a daily basis by the powerful electronic news media and the makers of news stories. To expect that ordinary people can opt for peace on their own, while the machinery of war remains intact and growing, is to invite a state of delusion and to trivialize the intellectual and cultural struggle that peace calls for.

Since the social programme of modernity is so directly relevant to the value of tolerance and the ability to reason, the larger social character of the process of modernization deserves a fresh look from the perspective of peace. For the project of modernity to remain worth pursuing, it needs an extensive review, and a recasting of its proposals for the future, both in what are known as 'developed' and 'developing' worlds. If globalization has any meaning, one of the first basic changes it must imply is a consensus to drop the developed–developing distinction and to recognize that all parts of the world, including the richer parts, are faced with

a crisis. There are several indicators of this common crisis. One of these is the impact of modernization and development on culture and people's own resources of well-being. The discussion of this aspect of modernization often starts by citing the security that science and technology have given to the humankind against diseases, early death and natural calamities.

This is a good point to begin, but no impartial discussion on modernity can end here. Modern healthcare has offered little to the vast majority of the poor except bare survival; to others who can afford an expensive regime of care it has given an ambivalent kind of security. Dependence on the globally managed pharmaceutical industry and institutionalized care has encouraged a fragile, powerless selfhood, ready to sink into the very shadows of superstition and belief in fate and religious orthodoxy, out of which modern science was believed to be capable of drawing humanity. This aspect of modernity is, no doubt, linked to the efficiency and ingenuity of the state, but it is becoming increasingly evident that many of the wealthier states of the so-called developed nations are unable to sustain systems of healthcare which are both decent and equitable. The failures of countries like India and Pakistan on the frontiers of people's health and well-being can easily be attributed to the inefficient, misguided policies they have pursued in the recent past, during which what there was of a rudimentary health system has been dismantled in the name of liberalization. If we widen the scope of 'health' as a term to include mental or psychological well-being, the failure becomes all the more apparent. It is by opening up this frontier of health for objective investigation that we might be able to

recognize the necessity to redefine development even where it has been successfully accomplished, i.e., in the so-called developed countries. Their need is indeed greater, if one goes by the verdict given by the psychological critics of modernity like Erich Fromm and Bruno Bettleheim, who revealed the extent of insanity prevalent in prosperous societies.[3] Healthcare is a primary zone where the project of development for modernization has brought about new forms of collective insecurities and alienation on a mass scale.

Another such frontier is education. Its spread, including the spread of its junior, namely literacy, was believed to be the harbinger of popular enlightenment, not to mention employment and higher incomes. Far from delivering on these promises, the expanded systems of modern education have intensified the frustration of the unemployed and the erosion of skills, both productive and cultural. Modern education has failed not merely in the colonized world where it aimed at 'civilizing' the native, but also in the homelands of the colonizers. Lack of employment opportunities for the educated is one aspect of this failure, and it is debatable because education is just one of the many components of an economic order which fails to generate adequate, meaningful work for all. However, there is another dimension where the failure of modern education is singular and incapable of being shared with other causes. That is in the dimension of values. No observer of modern South Asia can fail to notice the callousness of the highly educated towards routine situations involving profit. For instance, the killing of unborn girls with the help of modern medical technology cannot occur without the active participation of professionally qualified doctors.

This example, however, can only vaguely hint at the general denudation of culture and values that has taken place under the auspices of universalized schooling in countries where the project has apparently succeeded. Sri Lanka is a case in point. The spread of ethnic identities and the rise of state violence have occured simultaneously with the spread of elementary education. In the developed world too, universal literacy has not meant greater awareness or popular activism, even in extreme cases where political leaders have been able to induce their public to support the invasion of a distant country on the basis of an unproven threat. The rise of revivalist politics or identity, and acquiescence to the use of violence as a means to maintain status quo, can hardly be described as an unpredicted outcome of modernity and development. A complex mix of psychological, economic, political and cultural variables can be found in every case of failed modernity. No one can convincingly analyse, in proportionate terms, the role and contribution of different factors active behind a specific conflict. Howsoever precise an attempt to analyse might be, the role of broad or sweeping forces like ethos and mindset will remain unaccounted for. The case of nuclear security is probably the most illustrative to be used for a brief reference. Those in the business of governance in both India and Pakistan say that nuclear capacity has created a sense of national security. The claim artlessly invites us to imagine the level and the scale of the insecurity which India and Pakistan have now overcome with their newly developed nuclear strength. The anatomy of their national insecurities needs no expensive x-ray. We can study it quite satisfactorily by considering the craving for self-respect that both India

and Pakistan chronically feel in the comity of modern nation states. A critique of their nuclear programmes on economic grounds would be futile, for the point about ownership of an atom bomb has little to do with its cost in money. Its ownership is a question of character, of the owner's madness and desire to inflict the kind of pain America caused the Japanese in 1945. Developing nuclear capacity is as much a function of a society's scientific manpower and infrastructure as of its lack of peace within, expressed as suspicion and hatred of those around it, near or far. In this light, we can view America's supreme insecurity as the most powerful state in the world, as well as its hatred and suspicion of all other nations. Our suspicion and hatred has two known objects, and Pakistan's has one.

Further probing of these facets of the national mind would reveal an ever-growing identification in both India and Pakistan with the US. This brings us to one more orbit of factors compelling us to argue that the project of modernization cannot promise peace unless it is substantially revised. In this orbit, we notice the terrible losses of the vibrancy and creativity for which the West was known. They have been erased, and a monotonous discourse of the war on terror has taken over. Juxtaposed with the war on terror is the neo-liberal regime in economic and social planning. Advocates of the regime distract us from noticing that neo-liberal economic fundamentalism is as violent as any religious fundamentalism; that the war on terror is much too transparent an excuse for extending the scope of war, covering not just rival ideologies, but also the racial and cultural diversity of modern nation states. In this stance, neo-liberal

economic recipes now do look like an ideology, which can only be countered by redefining modernity.

For India and Pakistan, this road is somewhat buried in the sands of colonialism, but is recoverable. Policies on health, education, economy and culture are of key significance for the recovery of this road. The experience of having been colonized means that neither country can confidently depend on its own inventiveness. There are pressures to conform to the prescriptions emanating from globally dominant organizations and ex-colonial powers. These pressures are often crude, but even otherwise, they are able to bend us because there is considerable domestic support. Corruption is one important factor of this support, bureaucratic inefficiency and middle class disillusionment with the state are another. External pressures take advantage of both and often end up injecting an irrational streak in policies, subverting the core of modernity in the name of modernization. Systems of health and education in India have gone through this process in the recent years under the auspices of the structural adjustment programme. The immediate consequences of this massive process are deceptive and often inscrutable. Pakistan's experience of externally distorted policies is much longer, but we can hardly expect India to learn from it. Both countries are today in a similar situation insofar as their devastated public health and state education systems are concerned. The project of modernization has now fallen into the hands of private interests, whose inclination is to go with the flow of events and processes triggered by the structural adjustment of India's economy to global capitalism.

The lack of ingenuity and the dependence on external

resources and ideas for further modernization have been greatly exacerbated by the rise of America as an aggressive super-power. The dependency syndrome has now stretched to the point where peace between India and Pakistan is said to be a matter of America's will. So long as America does not want a war in South Asia, the argument goes, a war will not occur. Apart from being an affront to the sovereignty of two free nation states, the idea also lacks historical sense. Superpowers and other dominant countries did try to diffuse the tension in South Asia in 1971, but local factors proved far stronger and ultimately led to war. In any case, it is far from clear why it would be a particularly great tragedy for America if India and Pakistan fought another war and ended up using the nuclear weapons they possess. A devastated South Asia would be an easier resource to exploit than it is today. Already, under the present circumstances, US-dominated transnational corporations are doing all they can to exploit the market that the combined population of India and Pakistan provide.

VII

Beyond Warring Identities

Education works in so many different ways and has so
many different meanings that one cannot risk making
a generalized statement about its nature and role. It
can trigger energies which are not necessarily coherent,
affecting people, nations, and the world itself, in ways not
always predictable. Who would have thought that the very
system designed to colonize India would inspire so many to
seek freedom from British rule? No less plausible is the
counter-argument that education did assist in the colonization
of India and stunted its imagination, to the extent that the
attainment of political freedom could not make much
difference to the system of education itself. The first theory
reminds us of the potential education has for serving as a
means of resistance; the latter reminds us how subtly it works
in favour of the status quo. Evidence can be found in support
of both arguments, and it would be difficult to judge which
evidence is weightier. Education did inspire numerous political
and cultural leaders to imagine India as an independent
nation. The opportunity for education also brought about a
social revolution, which is still unfolding in the structure of

the relationship between the Dalits and upper caste Hindus,
and between women and men. At the same time, it is hard to
deny that the colonial system of education is responsible for
India's continued volatility. If people remain so vulnerable
to emotional arousal that crowds can be turned into mobs
and riots can be staged according to a schedule, at least some
of the burden of responsibility must fall on a system of
education which was originally designed to domesticate the
collective mind.

The relationship between education and war offers a
similar set of well-matched arguments. It is widely believed
that the spread of education enhances the probability of peace.
Underlying this belief is a benign view of education as an
agency or force which expands the mind. This image of
education does convey a certain truth, but it prevents the
awareness that the number of individual cases to which the
truth may apply is rather small in most systems of education.
Also, it doesn't occur to us, when we listen to this kind of
claim, that education can also close up the mind. In that
case, it must not be education in the proper sense of the term,
the proponents of the benign view remind us. Their insistence
that education can only be positive reflects a perception that
is so popular and forceful that no effort to seek a
reconsideration seems capable of success. Perhaps we have
no choice in the matter of conceding that as a term, education
has a normative character. The plea that education must be
analysed like any other social process with a view to
distinguishing the kind of impact it makes in different
situations constitutes a very difficult task of persuasion.
J. Krishnamurti's argument that modern education has made

a significant contribution towards creating an ethos favouring war belongs to this category of effort. Whenever I have tried to cite it in order to make the point that education is a complex agency, my audience has taken Krishnamurti's argument as a dramatic reminder of something having gone wrong, or of education having been misused in the modern world. Krishnamurti has explained his position by citing the use of education to build national identities in all countries of the world. When education is used in this manner, it inflates the collective ego and makes it indifferent to the humanity of whosoever happens to be 'the other'. This is how modern education closes up the minds of millions of people at an early, formative stage of their life. They become amenable to political and other forms of propaganda, which are then mounted in the defence of the nation. Arguing this way, Krishnamurti poses the question of whether education can be conceptualized differently so that it will make people impervious to narrow nationalistic propaganda.

Surely, Krishnamurti is not suggesting that if people are given no education at all, they would be less manipulable by propaganda. To allege that he is romanticizing illiteracy would be entirely wrong. It would be like saying that Rousseau was upholding the state of nature as an ideal for human beings. Sadly, such caricaturing is all too common; worse, it is often done by otherwise knowledgeable people. Perhaps it is the tendency to cling to the idea of modernity and progress which impels many to ridicule any criticism of modern institutions like schools. In a sinking ship, any talk about reconsidering the route of the journey seems like intolerable nonsense. Every attempt to steady the ship and make it capable of continuing

the journey as planned is regarded as the only sensible approach. This is precisely the mindset in which those of us who believe in education as a means of consolidating a modern, secular social order in India find ourselves these days. We feel surrounded. The growing menace of religious separatism and fundamentalism has all but taken over the cultural, and much of the political sphere. The West is no longer a source of inspiring theories of social change, but rather, a callous exporter of cheap cultural merchandise. The popular response to it has taken the form of religious revivalism, and that looks threatening to secular modernizers. We simply wish all these things would change and that our agenda of constructing an enlightened citizenry would proceed uncontested. We hold our breath each time a threat of war with Pakistan resurfaces, and watch with hope every time the so-called peace process restarts, under the very same regime that only recently used war as a means to mobilize support. We see no choice in joining the chorus which decries Pakistan as a failed state that cannot come to peace with India unless it democratizes.

Krishnamurti's critique of nationalistic education is extremely vulnerable to the charge that he is unmindful of the dangers that lurk in the neglect of nation-building. It is easy to charge him with being a social mystic who does not appreciate the role that nationalism continues to play as a source of motivation for personal sacrifice and excellence. It is also possible for some to perceive him as anti-national. When my students of peace education read his talks on education and world peace, their first reaction was one of disbelief that someone can talk like this. Some felt quite

manifestly disturbed, others wanted to know how India could be protected from external threats if education stops inculcating nationalism. That J. Krishnamurti is talking about narrow nationalism, not nationalism in itself, brings some relief, but the precise difference between the two eludes description. No one feels quite certain that nationalistic fervour can be created in children without at least a symbolic invocation of threat.

If we scratch below the surface, we will locate the necessity to distinguish the historical role of education from its normative meaning and function. And therein lies the solution to the problem that Krishnamurti—and before him Rousseau—had posed, of how to retain faith in education without losing sight of its historical character. As a trainer of human instincts, education has an important role which can contribute to peace. This role, however, depends for its impact on a system under the auspices of which education is imparted. The system covers not just education, but many other spheres of the state.[1]

Under the conditions of modernity, the state acts to promote and consolidate the rational structures of collective identities known as nationalities. Some of them are stable, others are still forming or struggling. Modernity permits no break or flexibility in the rational ordering of these collective bodies, except at the cost of war, within nations or between them. It discourages educative action which aims at questioning this rational way of ordering the human collective. Education can hardly be differently organized or pursued for new aims unless it departs from the rationality so firmly established in the modern notion of the state's sovereignty as being representative of a collective identity.

By itself, identity is a dualistic concept. It requires us to think in terms of a 'self' which is distinct from an 'other'. Construction of the self is hardly possible without constructing an 'other', a true other which cannot be included in the self. Applied to the individual, this dualistic construction has definite use, especially in the early part of life, in that it promotes the motivation to build and sustain a self. By maintaining a strong sense of the self, one is able to develop a sense of purpose in one's life. This is an important aspect of growing up which calls upon everyone to locate a purpose or goal. It may not be accurate to contrast modernity in this respect with a pre-modern state of existence, but it is historically true that industrialization and the advancement of capitalism—the two most important among the factors of modernization—have made the individual responsible in ways which would have been inconceivable in earlier times. One salient way in which modernity compels the individual to be responsible is in the context of developing a sense of purpose. As individuals, we must find goals that satisfy us, motivate us, and protect us from dissolving into meaninglessness under the onslaught of circumstances and information that we are unable to make sense of. An individual identity or sense of ourself helps us to locate and sustain a sense of purpose in life. Once developed, this identity provides continuity in one's pursuits. In this sense, identity is an important condition for education to assist the young in their attempt to negotiate a changing, often bewildering world. This bond between education and identity is a characteristic of modern childhood, quite unthinkable and irrelevant in the context of childhood in any earlier culture that we know

of historically. For this reason, earlier systems of education are also rather unhelpful as a source of guidance, though they do sometimes inspire us in a tantalizing manner to shape education today or in the future.

Identity, however, has another dimension to it which is not capable of being fully separated from its individual dimension. In this dimension, identity refers to the collective self, which the young assimilate in their personality starting from the early years. Whereas individual identity is an assiduous product of nurturing, collective identity is a received feeling. It also has a motivating function. Aspects of the collective self blend into the formative individual self through processes which are embedded in culture. Among the most firmly embedded processes are the ones relating to the use of language, and practices linked to religious faith. The growing child becomes 'different' from other children in the community even before he or she has any stable individual 'self' organized around personal preferences, achievements or aspirations. In creating and nurturing a sense of purpose or meaning in one's life, the aspects of the self which have their origins in a collective, inherited identity have a shaping role as much as the other personal aspects have. Those of us who have spent our childhoods in a relatively restful period of national history, or in a part of the nation devoid of turmoil in that period, may not fully appreciate the interdependence of the 'collective self' and the 'individual self'. Similarly, it may require a special effort or inquiry for citizens of a recognized, independent nation to perceive the problem faced by children of a nation in struggle. I had not thought about this problem even in theoretical terms till I read a thesis by

Honey Uberoi on the development of a 'self' in Tibetans in exile. It made me suddenly quite aware of the blessing I had enjoyed in being born conveniently after the Indo-Pak partition, and of growing up in Nehru's India, far away from the territories where India was still being contested.

How we might define the role of the school in the context of these inherited aspects of identity is a moot question. Certainly, schools do have an enabling role, inasmuch as a teacher can set up the ideal of a true Christian, Muslim or Hindu to motivate a child. Invoking a national identity is a sphere in which the school might perceive its role as special, because the family or community may not treat the nation in as serious a manner as the state might. As an instrument of the state, the school in modern society adopts this function with a legitimate penchant. It encourages children to work towards becoming true or ideal Indians, or Pakistanis, as the case may be. Schools make their contribution to the construction of a forceful collective self or identity on the edifice already prepared by the family and community with the help of other ingredients. Quite often, the school treats this special role as a means of broadening the collective dimensions of the child's self-identity. The linguistic, religious or other forms of collective identity appear to be narrower in comparison to the national ideal, which the school sets up and uses as a means to nurture a sense of purpose and aspiration capable of transcending the personal self, as well as the culturally defined self.

Customarily, this is defined as the civic aim of education, as it refers to the training required for nurturing the ideals of citizenship in young minds. J. Krishnamurti, and before him,

Tagore, and long before both of them, Rousseau, had visualized the problem that civic education would present to the teacher. It has been rightly described as the central question arising out of Rousseau's work on education—as his legacy, so to say. This question is: 'Can we educate a child to be a good citizen without stifling his or her humanity?' The term 'good citizen' has several implications, one of which is loyalty to the state. In the context of modern nation states, this loyalty includes a higher commitment to one's own nation as opposed to other nations. Civic education aims at identification with one's own nation and loyalty to its sovereign state. In the context of identity, civic education necessarily creates an oppositional binary between one's own nation and others' nations. It also socializes the child into accepting the state's choice as an ultimate or binding choice for oneself in certain circumstances, war with another nation being one.

If the nation state one belongs to goes to war with another nation state, one has no choice except to support or join the war. The violence it might inflict on the citizens of the 'other' nation cannot offer us a ground to dissociate ourselves from the war. The ideal of citizenship, under modern circumstances, prevents the educated person from exercising independent judgement in such a case. Howsoever questionable a war in which his or her nation is engaged may be from the citizen's point of view, good citizens have little choice but to support it even if, emotionally and intellectually, they abhor the idea of inflicting injuries to their fellow human beings living in another country. The state of their own nation minimizes this abhorrence and the psychological pain implied in being

a helpless spectator of large-scale violence, by socializing children to identify so completely with their own nation, that they cease to think of the citizens of other nations as ordinary, fellow human beings. Education enables the good citizen to develop a double vision along with the kind of sanity that such a vision offers. This double vision permits the educated citizen to view the members of his or her own country as ordinary men and women, while the 'other' country becomes just a territory with a name. Men and women who might feel the injuries and pain inflicted by weapons disappear under the magic of the double vision. Rousseau's question makes us wonder whether an education which imparts this kind of double vision should be called education at all.

In modern political and educational thought, Rousseau's challenge—educating good citizens who are also good human beings—has been contemplated in depth. In India, both Tagore and Gandhi worked hard to preserve the universalistic aims of education while attempting to tune education to national goals. Both developed institutional and pedagogic practices which revolved around needs rather than abstract ideals. In the case of Tagore, aesthetic needs received precedence. The expressive components of artistic activity emerged as a means of channelling the child's energy away from aggression and violence. Tagore also underlined the illegitimacy of nationalism, as Ashis Nandy has sharply named it, by insisting on institutional practices which could socialize the young into a community of individuals capable of carrying diverse identities. Gandhi, on the other hand, proposed a curriculum which treated dexterity in manual work as a higher goal than knowledge. He hoped to soften the ego-

boosting effects of knowledge with the collectivizing influence of manual work. Read in the context of his Utopia of a self-reliant small community, Gandhi's proposal for new education (Nai Talim) offers a means of cultivating a humanistic, charitable nationhood. It is consistent with his dream of India as a society where nobody would be regarded as a foreigner.

If we look beyond India, Russell and Neill, and later on, Holt, presented critiques of modern education systems and proposed promising alternatives from the perspective of peace within oneself and in the world. Each one of them saw the destructive role education plays in modern, industrialized societies by emphasizing competitive greatness. To counter these divisive effects, they proposed humanist curricula and practices derived from diverse intellectual resources. Russell suggested rational means of making education an instrument of peace, with the help of strategies such as the compulsion to teach the national history as written by foreigners. Neill advocated an institutional ethos which would enable children's latent energies suppressed during their regimented upbringing to be released. For Holt, the failure of education in America became symbolic of a larger institutional collapse of modernity, demanding deeper remedies like reconstruction of the home as an educational space. Viewed as members of a critical community of thinkers and practitioners, Tagore, Gandhi, Russell, Neill and Holt indicated the need to distinguish socialization from formal or institutional education, and to recognize that the two cannot stay distinguished unless we assign to the latter a more inclusive role.

In popular parlance, education is treated as a pervasive concept covering all the sources of a child's learning, which may be as varied as the home, the neighbourhood, the community, its places of worship, and the school. In this extended usage, education becomes synonymous with absorbing whatever one's experience brings. This ubiquitous view of education fails to recognize the advantage which the school enjoys as an institutional space where the child and the teacher can engage with the world's knowledge, and even question it without being directly bound by the grip of practical consequences. The child's life at home is characterized by precisely that kind of grip. The bonds of relationship which define the family as an institution ensure that the young child lives his or her reality at home as the only possible reality. Behaviour towards those who are part of one's own community (and others who are not) is also shaped by a sort of emotional compulsion which allows no deviation or questioning, and which makes the practical consequences of one's actions quite significant. Modern electronic media, especially television, offer little real possibility for the child to engage in an exchange of ideas and feelings, although such a possibility exists in theory. The technologically crafted system of images and messages forms an overwhelming presence, with its own unique emotional force. Only the school offers, at least in theory, the possibility of dealing with the world in a context which is relatively free of immediate or practical consequences. From the point of view of the child, the consequences of *not* learning may be immediate or practical, involving punishment in one form or another, but the consequences of learning are not. The school has an inbuilt mandate to relate to anything and

everything in the course of its attempt to introduce the child to the world. The knowledge imparted at school is valid and usually arouses little opposition, because it is decontextualized. The task of giving it a context is left to the teacher. The task assumes that contextualization will help the child grasp it better. In other words, the school's aim is to enable the child to acquire a generalized kind of knowledge; contextualizing is merely a pedagogic means to help achieve this aim. This is quite different from the knowledge that the child acquires from the family and the community in the course of socialization. This knowledge is highly contextualized, which is one reason why its assimilation has an emotional depth or quality to it. The case of the media as a source of knowledge is somewhat less clear, but its approach is also context-specific; so much so that similar events occurring in different parts of the country or the world look different and unrelated. The school has a unique role to perform in comparison to these other sources of knowledge in that it has the potential—which, of course, it may not realize—to subject all forms of knowledge to rational scrutiny and reflection. In a social order inspired by democratic ideals, the school cannot be viewed as an extension of home and community, or as merely one of the several institutions educating the child. While the family, the community and religious institutions have a socializing function which aims mainly at ensuring the continuity of beliefs and values, the school has an educative role which includes the possibility of critically examining everything, including one's own socialization. It is this pervasive mandate to encourage contemplation that makes the school an instrument of social change.

It is a common and understandable belief that progressive educational thought creates better chances for peace to prevail than traditional education did. This belief is based on an appreciation of the emphasis progressive pedagogic methods place on individual autonomy, and on the cultivation of reflective skills. One expects that children's capacities to reflect in an analytical manner on both knowledge and experience would enable them to critically examine their own socialization, and thereby to circumvent the reproductive function of socialization. This argument has great appeal, and it is not surprising that it has encouraged many national educational systems to seek energies and ideas for reform aimed at equipping schools and teachers *against* certain aspects of early socialization; for example in the context of gender relations. Progressive pedagogy emphasizes the autonomy of the individual, making him or her accountable in an existential sense. In the discourse of progressive education, the individual learner does not simply absorb the knowledge imparted through teaching, but learns to use it in a judicious way on unfamiliar problems and in the middle of uncertain, changing circumstances. Progressivism in pedagogy is individualistic in its orientation, and normative too, though, on the surface it seems to deny a stereotype of the 'normal' child.

If we look below the surface, with a historical awareness of the twentieth century, during which both these perspectives, i.e., the individualistic and the normative, flourished and influenced educational systems, especially of the so-called developed countries, we notice an assumed notion, of who the 'successful learner' might be, inherent in them. This notion, as Popkewitz, has suggested, privileges the intellectually

autonomous or reflective learner whose individuality transcends any other identity over others who, through an emotional bond, remain tied to a sense of community which is regional, religious, linguistic, or of some other kind. The socialization that the successful learner of a progressive system of education imbibes may indeed impart a certain sense of superiority over the others, whose success is treated as being of a lower order inasmuch as it does not make them fully autonomous individuals or competent problem-solvers in an unpredictable universe of circumstances.[2] The social class to which the successful learners of a progressive system may belong is also likely to be far higher than that of the others. After all, progressive pedagogies are more expensive; within a society, they may not be accessible to all entrants in the same measure, and among nations, they have been confined largely to the richer countries.

These critical remarks are not meant to suggest that we have little to learn from the achievements of the progressive education systems of developed countries. However, one needs to take into account the historical character of modern educational theory which has, at least so far, failed to show an easy compatibility with the egalitarian goals of modern democracies. The question does arise—why has the 'progressively' educated citizen of the developed world failed for so long to be moved by the sharp disparities he or she must notice in the world's nations? The question can be extended to ask how the very nation that attracts talented youth from all over the world to its renowned universities and institutes of learning can bombard inhabitants of other nations, causing destitution and misery, while the majority

of its public ignores or supports such activities. Apparently, its highly developed system of education has gone terribly wrong, or has lost its ethical core. It has failed to cultivate the capacity to relate to the 'others' or feel for them. To say this is not to deny the gains made in many spheres of material and social life by means of progressive pedagogies. Seen from the point of view of peace, pedagogic modernism is as much a product of the hegemonic uses of knowledge as is the invention of the atomic bomb. The historical character of modern theories of education cannot be ignored when we assess the usefulness of these theories from the perspective of peace. At the same time, it would be incorrect to say that progressive pedagogies are not necessary for educational reform in India, or that we should not experiment with them because they have failed to deliver elsewhere. Quite the contrary is true. In our system of education, the child is an oppressed entity, and one can say with little hesitation that the system of education as it is presently constituted destroys the potential of millions. This would apply even more directly to the system of education in Pakistan, which is quite similar to ours except in its remarkably explicit promotion of religious bigotry from the earliest school years.

For both countries, educational reform would mean a considerable dose of progressive methods of teaching, and reorganization of curriculum along constructivist lines, but these measures would not suffice. A critical reappraisal of progressive pedagogies, and curricular theorizing consistent with them, would be required for Indian and Pakistani systems to avoid the trap of normativism. Such a trap is already building up, throwing the large majority of children into the

metaphorical dustbin of unemployability and vulnerability, and being co-opted by destructive ideologies. Only a small proportion of the child population ends up receiving what might constitute a substantial amount and quality of education. The rest are routinely condemned to join the vast underclass of the so-called marginalized when, in fact, they form the majority. As it is presently constituted, progressivism in education, including its constructivist orientation in knowledge, offers a rather inadequate vision for this huge underclass of children. In many parts of South Asia, they grow up to join the armies of those fighting one or the other kind of war, either within a nation or between two nations. Malnourished and barely literate, but available for recruitment for a cause, they pose a threat not so much to civil society as to the very identity of South Asian nations as independent states.

Proponents of universalized education tend to forget that improving the quality of education is as important as its availability, but quality is extremely hard to define, especially if we want to address the need for peace. Perceived purely in terms of efficiency of the educated or their ability to gain profitable means of living, quality in education offers no guarantee for the promotion of peace at any level—within oneself, or among the constituents of a society, or between nations. Indeed, it is likely that when education is viewed merely as a tool for building identities and economic development, it would serve to enhance intolerance. It would encourage an explicit kind of devotion to a territorial 'here' even as it constructs an imagined 'we'. The sense of 'here' in community memory may not find competing claims, made by other collective memories with a sense of belonging to the

same 'here', as being valid. The task before education is to question the exclusive claim of every collective memory, and by questioning it, to make the bonds of collective identity somewhat flexible. Whether or not education can do this can be a useful parameter to judge its quality. Only when education enables a child to accept the validity of competing memories can it be said to have the capacity to promote peace. This does not, of course, mean that education should not be used for building national identity. The point is that identity can be as much the subject of objective reflection as it is a source of motivation.

It is evident that for education to serve the cause of peace, it will have to stop serving as an instrument of exclusion and injustice. Reform in both the structure of education, so that it reaches out in an inclusive manner, and its content, is necessary. To some extent, the two kinds of reforms are interrelated, but the second category is harder to accomplish. A time will come, as it has come and remained in many countries of the world, including the ones we call developed, when nearly all of South Asia's children will attend school throughout their childhood. The question of a date when this will happen is important, but the point here is different. What will they learn at school? That is the more relevant question from the perspective of peace. Will they learn things that make their identities rigid and aggressive, or will they develop a mindful identity which might allow room for the thought that others who are different are not necessarily enemies? The future of South Asia depends on how curriculum designers respond to this question, on which alternative they choose. If they choose the first option, education will

continue to highlight differences and promote hostility. The countries of South Asia are doing this at present, though the degrees of intensity differ. Pakistani children are explicitly encouraged to draw inspiration from the past in order to develop a distinct self-identity. The knowledge of the past given to them is a kind of allegory which permits only certain meanings to be read, and these meanings are designed to mix history and myth. In Sri Lanka, the identity-building role of education has split national consciousness into violently charged halves. In Nepal and Bangladesh too, the contribution of education to the construction of a national identity is paradoxical. By attempting to promote national solidarity, formal education has weakened social cohesion. This is true of India as well. Our divided system of education nurtures an examination-oriented desire for success at the expense of values consistent with the Constitutional dream of a society in which justice shall provide the basis of peace.

Today's India is more sharply divided into rural and urban, between the rich and the poor, and also perhaps in terms of caste and community than it was at the time of Independence. Some people argue that economic growth always accompanies the sharpening of inequalities and identities too. Whatever the merit of this argument, peace in large parts of rural, and quite a few places in urban India has now become chronically dependent on the crude instruments of law and order. Peace of this kind does not last long. The insecurities aroused by the erosion of any hope for justice encourage violence and speed up the consolidation of unaccommodative identities, some of which have remarkably narrow and sectarian orbits. Others have a seemingly larger circle, but they are no less

rigid and prone to negative feelings towards others. A nationalist identity which depends on hatred towards other nations belongs to this latter category. Such an identity may look larger than, say, an identity based on a narrowly defined caste or community, but its role in inculcating aggression and violence is just the same.

In South Asian countries, national identities which have formed with the help of a print culture and schooling are much too narrow to accommodate the different forms of self-awareness which characterize common life. Formal education denies the range and vitality of everyday life experiences, in which the multiple identities of each individual are reprocessed all the time. Looking from the vantage point of ordinary life, there is no clash between national and other identities, both sub-national and transnational or regional. If schools could spare a few corners of the curriculum where a shared regional identity might develop without threatening the specific national identity of a child, we would give peace a long-term chance. These curricular corners can be assigned to basic needs like clean water and air, or to experiences which promise the training of sensibilities such as art. In other areas like the study of language, literature and the past, significant advances towards the creation of an accommodative awareness of different kinds of 'otherness' can be made without necessarily disturbing the legitimate nation-building role of education. South Asia could become a psychological and ethical reality one day if its seed is sown and watered even in a few such corners of the educated mind.

We talk of South Asia today as if it exists, whereas beyond existing as a geographical fact it doesn't actually constitute

anyone's psychological reality. By psychological reality I mean a world which matters. For a regional identity to become real, national identities must feel secure. The slow advance of a regional South Asian identity, even at the superficial level of transnational cooperation in matters like education and health, suggests that national identities are not yet sufficiently secure. The operational and symbolic value of international borders lies in that they give a sense of psychological security to those who reside inside the border. In certain kinds of peace discourses, borders usually figure as obstacles. Dissolution of a standing border is met with great jubilation and is perceived as a triumph of peace. The fall of the Berlin wall continues to be recalled as a wonderful event, with tears, smiles, and little flags. The memory of a borderless past also keeps the fantasy of a borderless future alive. In the Indo-Pak context, there are plenty of Indians who believe that nursing such a fantasy is a good and necessary strategy for working towards peace in South Asia. They need to ponder on the positive value that borders, once formed, contribute towards giving people a sense of security, and the role they can serve in nourishing curiosity. In the South Asian region, borders have been used to cultivate separation and a sense of irrelevance towards whatever is happening on the other side. Systems of education, which play a crucial role in socializing the young, have invested a great deal of energy in instructing children to perceive borders as the defining principles of identity. The early introduction to political boundaries implies that children see borders as a natural, rather than as a human, creation. By the time they are old enough to learn how maps are made—and most children do not learn it at all—they are

already emotionally imprinted with the idea that borders represent a state of nature. A major opportunity to build an identity which inspires and motivates without erasing the awareness of larger realities is sacrificed, and this is a major loss.

The times in which we want South Asia to gain confidence and peace are marked by relentless politicization of collective identities and the erosion of awareness. The struggle over identity we see in many conflict-ridden parts of the world, including South Asia, often hides a history of unresolved issues. They fester while the world's life moves on, letting the islands of violence expand in size, yet remaining islands surrounded by an ocean of indifference and mistaken perceptions. The contrary perception, that identity forms the root of conflict and that, therefore, it needs to be diluted, is also problematic, especially in the context of a faceless modernity reaching its epitome under the banner of globalized communication networks and markets. Peace requires an identity fed by several sources of nourishment, not just one. Modernity has dried up many such sources, and one which it prioritized over several others is now drying up too. The source I am referring to is that of the knowledge and skills a person may have, and which impart a sense of doing something well, apart from providing an occupation or means of livelihood. Ursula Huws is one of the few economists of our time who has examined the nature and scale of the problem that technological advancement now poses to occupational identity. The new manufacturing processes mark the peak of that long process in which machines were refined. In every successive wave of development, this process displaced people

from existing jobs and made their possession of specialized knowledge and skills irrelevant. In the current phase, Huws argues, new technology is taking absolute charge of a vast number of personal competencies required in manufacturing, office work, and in the creation of knowledge itself. In this round of technological development, occupational identity has no chance of forming in the case of the majority of people because no skill or knowledge remains relevant for long. Those who believe this is an inevitable outcome of the development of science and technology talk about the new world as a 'knowledge society' in which new knowledge is constantly developing at an ever increasing pace, and which has enough dynamism to sustain jobs in new services. Many of these jobs are casual or transient, rightly described as 'just-in-time' jobs required to supervise automated production and provide services in industries where human beings are still required, such as to answer customer queries on the phone. Some feel that we are approaching what Marx had predicted—a time when human beings will have no arduous work left to do. Marx thought that if such a time came under a socialist order, it would give humanity an opportunity to fully realize its intellectual and aesthetic potential; but if it came in a capitalist order, it would bring total alienation and the demise of social values.

Predictions of either kind assume that the European Enlightenment and the growth of modern science and technology symbolize a universal trajectory for humanity. Notions of universal modernity of the European kind persist under the patronage of such an assumption. Quite clearly, disillusionment of the kind that the French author François

Mauriac declared has failed to penetrate the ideology of modernity. In his foreword to Elie Wiesel's account of childhood in a Nazi concentration camp, Mauriac refers to the end of the dream 'which Western man conceived in the eighteenth century, whose dawn he thought he saw in 1789, and which, until 2 August 1914, had grown stronger with the progress of enlightenment and the discoveries of science'. Mauriac's perception is indeed a hard one to swallow today, when science is so politically correct, and belief in a scientific temper is still such a major part of the modern, liberal creed on which the hope for peace in many parts of the world seems to depend.[3]

We who live in India and Pakistan must realize that the politics of war and the social mindset which supports it are our own creations, and, therefore, we are the only ones who can change them. The conditions are, of course, not easy, and the delusion of modernity is deep. Violence without a cause is now common, and the creation of hysteria easily accomplished by politicians and the media. There is a terrible symmetry between the two countries in these matters. The West's concern for peace is touching, considering that South Asia provides the great Western manufacturers of arms a dependable harvest of sales. Both India and Pakistan are now equipped with nuclear arms. It is not surprising that South Asian politicians and civil servants, not to mention war experts, perceive the outcome of a nuclear war as a measure of their own clever planning. It will have to be a very compassionate God indeed who forgives them if there is a nuclear clash. Whether or not such a God exists, surely the common citizens of India and Pakistan have the right to ask

why their lives must be pawned by wily merchants and leaders. The fear of war and its horrors are increasingly going to be a source of stress among the young. If democracy continues to flourish in India, and survives in Pakistan, a day should come when the youth in both countries are able to sue politicians for causing stress and depression. Until that day, peace must remain the victim of a daily war, waged with words that inflame and policies which ignore the basic priorities of human life. And if peace is not simply a periodic escape from war—which is the main argument of this book—a counter-offensive for peace should become an everyday event.

Notes

Chapter I: Birla House and Rajghat

1. Literature on the subject of Mahatma Gandhi's assassination is surprisingly limited. *The Gandhi Murder Trial* by Tapan Ghosh (Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1975) is a practical guide to an otherwise difficult legal case to study. Ashis Nandy's psychoanalysis of Nathuram Godse is full of insight, but there is no substitute for the lengthy statement by Godse, *May it Please Your Honour* (Delhi: Surya, 1989) which he himself read out in court. Ashis Nandy's essay, *Final Encounter: The Politics of the Assassination of Gandhi* appears in *Rebellion to Republic*, ed. Robin Jeffery (Delhi: Sterling, 1990).

2. *Independence and Partition* (New Delhi: Sage, 2000) by Sucheta Mahajan is a recent addition to the vast body of Partition literature. Mushirul Hasan's two volumes titled *India Partitioned* (New Delhi: Roli, 1999) offer an attractive entry into this complex subject. Another volume worth consulting is *The Partition of India*, eds. C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970).

3. *Gandhi: His Gift of the Fight* (Rasulia: Friends Rural Centre, 1981) by Marjorie Sykes is a memoir of her life with Gandhi and Tagore.

4. *The Religion of Man* by Rabindranath Tagore has recently been reissued in *Selected Essays* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2004).

Chapter II: Litter in Lahore

1. My earlier study on the Indo-Pak conflict, which focuses on school textbooks, is called *Prejudice and Pride* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001).
2. A richly annotated edition of *Hind Swaraj*, with a long and highly informative introduction, has been brought out by the Cambridge University Press (ed. Anthony Parel) in 1997.
3. The future scenarios of the outcome of the Indo-Pak conflict drawn by Mani Shankar Aiyar can be found in his *Pakistan Papers* (Delhi: South Asia Books, 1994).

Chapter III: Perceptual History

1. For details of the life of the Begum of Bhopal, Abida Sultan, see *Memoirs of a Rebel Princess* (Karachi: OUP, 2004).
2. N.C. Saxena has drawn several counterfactual accounts of India's partition in *Historiography of Communalism in India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan: *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India* (Delhi: Manohar, 1981).

Chapter IV: Why Nobody Minds a War

1. Raghuvir Sahay's short story, *Seema Ke Paar Ka Aadmi*, and a few other writings and poems concerned with Indo-Pak peace are included in a reader edited by Krishna Kumar (Delhi: Rajkamal, 2003).
2. Humra Quraishi's *Kashmir: The Untold Story*, provides a racy introduction to the turbulence that continues to mark life in contemporary Kashmir (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004).
3. Urvashi Butalia's *Speaking Peace* (London: Zed Books, 2002) gives a feminist perspective on this turbulence.
4. An unusual study of American culture and values as reflected in Walt Disney's comics was carried out by the Chilean

sociologist Ariel Dorfman (jointly with A. Mattelart) in *How to Read Donald Duck* (New York: International General, 1975).

Chapter V: A Problem of Assessment

1. *The Heart Divided* by Mumtaz Shah Nawaz was originally written during the 1940s and published for the first time in 1957. This unique, apparently autobiographical novel, has recently been brought out by Penguin Books (New Delhi: 2004).
2. Oesterheld's study of Gandhi's educational proposal appears in *Education and Social Change in South Asia*, eds. Krishna Kumar and Joachim Oesterheld (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007).
3. M. Mujib memoir, 'The Partition of India in Retrospect', of the late 1930s, is quite unique in its explanatory power in Mushirul Hasan, ed. *India's Partition* (Delhi: OUP, 1994).
4. Muhammad Iqbal's letters to E.J. Thompson during the 1930s have been edited by S. Hasan Ahmed in *The Idea of Pakistan and Iqbal* (Patna: Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, 2003).
5. Jamal Malik has analysed the implications of colonialism for post-Independence politics in Pakistan in his book *The Colonization of Islam* (Delhi: Manohar, 1996).

Chapter VI: Inventive Modernity

1. Ursula M. Franklin's *The Real World of Technology* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1990) carries her Massey lectures. Also, Ursula Huws is an important commentator on the critical challenges that the new information technology has posed for a cohesive social order. See her book *The Making of a Cyberteriat* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003; Kharagpur: Cornerstone Publications, Indian Edition, 2004).
2. Rabindranath Tagore's essay *Civilisation and Progress* has

been reissued in *Selected Essays* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2004).

3. Erich Fromm (The Sane Society; New York: Fawcett Publications, 1965) and Bruno Bettleheim's (Surviving; New York: Vintage, 1980) provide two strident critiques of modernity.

Chapter VII: Beyond Warring Identities

1. Rousseau, Russell, A.S. Neill, J. Krishnamurti and John Holt belong to the line of progressive thinkers whose ideas offer a framework for peace-oriented learning. Rousseau's *Emile* was written in 1760. Its Everyman's Library edition offers a useful introduction by P.D. Jimack. Bertrand Russell's *Education and Social Order* is now available in a Routledge edition. A revised edition of *Summerhill School* by A.S. Neill has been published by St Martin's Griffin in 2005. J.Krishnamurti's *Education and the Significance of Life* is available, along with his other dialogues, from the Krishnamurti Foundation of India. John Holt's *How Children Learn*, which has been reissued recently (New York: Perseus, 1995), is one of his several popular books on education.

2. A critique of progressive educational thought by Popkewitz, *The Production of Reason and Power*, appears in *Cultural History and Education*, eds. T.S. Popkewitz, *et al* (New York: Routledge Falmer, 2001).

3. François Mauriac's foreword appears in *Night* by Elie Wiesel (London: Penguin Books, 1981).

Acknowledgements